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ABSTRACT

The traditional historiography of science from the late-nineteenth through the
mid-twentieth centuries has broadly claimed that the Copernican revolution in astronomy
irrevocably damaged the practice of judicial astrology. However, evidence to the contrary
suggests that judicial astrology not only continued but actually expanded during the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. During this time period, judicial astrologers
accomplished this by appropriating contemporary science and mathematics. Copernicus’s
De revolutionibus, in particular, provided better mathematics for determining the
positions of the planets than the prevailing Ptolemaic system and reformist astrologers
interested in making astrology a precise, mathematical science embraced this new
astronomy.
This study evaluates the impact that Copernicus’s heliocentric theory of the
cosmos had on the practice of judicial astrology, particularly within the English court
patronage system between the publication of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus in 1543 and
the Restoration of the monarchy and founding of the Royal Society in 1660. In England,
while noble patrons defined the value of science in terms of its practical utility, many
English judicial astrologers successfully argued for scientific legitimacy based on their
ability to precisely predict planetary locations. Contrary to their European counterparts on
the Continent, English patrons typically required tangible, practical results to justify their
support of client-scientists. The heliocentric theory received a largely positive reaction in
England, and many astrologers readily employed its mathematics to make more precise
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predictions of planetary locations, which would presumably lead to better
prognostications of human events. As long as scientists and patrons defined science in
these exclusively mathematical terms, astrology could comfortably exist within these
scientific boundaries.
However, throughout the mid-sixteenth century, multiple processes occurred that
changed astrology from a science into a popular belief in England. Patrons began to lose
interest in astrology and thus financed fewer astrologers, and with the instability of the
Civil War, fewer patrons were in positions of power to provide this sort of support.
Furthermore, as astrology enjoyed increased popularity among the lower and merchant
classes of England through almanac and pamphlet publications, scientists saw it in their
best professional interest to consciously distance themselves from astrology and redefine
and re-categorize it beyond the reasonable margins of proper scientific practice. In short,
while astrology declined as a scientific activity during the latter half of the seventeenth
century, it found success as a popular activity beyond the confines of conventional
science.
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INTRODUCTION

When Copernicus wrote in his seminal astronomical treatise De revolutionibus
orbium coelestium that “in so many…ways do the planets bear witness,” he was referring
to how their observed motions provided evidence for the earth’s mobility.1 But for most
of the scientifically-educated elite in sixteenth-century Europe, the planets bore witness
in quite another way and provided evidence of a very different kind—that of their
astrological influence over human events.2 Copernicus’s epoch-making work, of course,
displaced the earth from the center of the cosmos and replaced it with the sun, but it also
provided more precise calculations for the prediction of planetary positions than the
Ptolemaic system. Among astrologers interested in applying this new astronomical data
to the prognostication of human events, a great reform movement flourished throughout
much of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Eventually, however, the reform
movement foundered, scientists and their patrons lost interest, and astrology relocated to
other more receptive venues. The narrative of astrology’s scientific decline in the latter
half of the seventeenth century is less a story about the elimination of a superstition and
more a story about how science was defined, who defined it, and what values determined
its definition. Most scientists accepted astrology in the early sixteenth century and most
1

Nicolaus Copernicus, De revolutionibus orbium coelestium [1543],trans. Edward Rosen (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978).
2
See especially, Jim Tester, A History of Western Astrology (Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 1987), 197-201
and Hilary M. Carey, Courting Disaster: Astrology at the English Court and University in the Later Middle
Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 92-116. Some later medieval and early modern rulers who
were major proponents of astrology include Richard II of England, Charles V of France, Frederick II of the
Holy Roman Empire, Ezzelino III da Romano of the March Treviso, as well as several Renaissance popes
such as Innocent VIII, Leo X, and Paul III.
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did not by the late seventeenth century—the responsibility for this lies not only in how
astrology was reformed but also in how science was defined. What follows is an analysis
of these two interconnected processes.
Credit for the “demise” of astrology is usually given to the disintegration of the
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmos, which was inaugurated by Copernicus and fulfilled by
Newton. However, considerable evidence suggests instead that the Copernican theory did
not hinder the major positions of astrology and in some cases, for a time, actually
bolstered them. Given the fact that Copernicus’s De revolutionibus offered a better
mathematical model for determining the positions of the planets, its application in
astrological texts should not be surprising; yet, few scholars have noted this with more
than a passing interest. The traditional view of historians about Copernicanism and
astrology argues that the Scientific Revolution in general and heliocentric astronomy in
particular sounded the death knell for astrology as a serious academic discipline.3
Auguste Bouché-Leclercq’s L’Astrologie Grecque, among the first works to view
astrology in the context of the history of ideas rather than merely as a superstition, was
typical of late nineteenth-century positivistic approaches to the history of science.
Leclercq wrote that “once the Earth was reduced to the state of a planet and launched into
space, the base [of astrology] was removed, and all the scaffolding crumbled at once”
adding that there was a fundamental “incompatibility between astrology and the system

3

See, for example, Don Allen Cameron, The Star-Crossed Renaissance: The Quarrel about Astrology its
Influence in England (New York Octagon Books, 1941) and Theodore Otto Wedel, The Medieval Attitude
toward Astrology, Particularly in England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920).
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once proposed by Aristarchus of Samos, and since demonstrated by Copernicus.”4
Leclercq argued that the “celestial influence” of the stars required a geometric focal
point, and the geocentric model of the cosmos provided this astrological requisite.
Despite his reasonably fair assessment of astrology—as a strain of Western thought once
believed by great men and thus worthy of careful study—Leclercq followed the
progressive historiographical tradition and praised the demise of astrology as part of the
story of scientific advancement.
Other historians from the early-twentieth century followed suit. Leclercq’s
contemporary Franz Cumont averred that “progress in astronomy” ultimately destroyed
astrology by destroying the “false hypothesis on which it is based, namely the geocentric
theory of the universe.”5 Unlike Leclercq, who confined his research to mathematical
astrology, Cumont expanded this approach to include not only scientific issues related to
the study of astrology but also its religious aspects. Cumont was interested primarily in
the Greco-Roman era, which led him to study the syncretic aspects of astrology and its
relationship to the religions of Late Antiquity, Mithraism in particular.6 Though he did
little research into early modern astrology, Cumont nevertheless mentioned Copernicus
or heliocentrism over half a dozen times in his seminal work Astrology and Religion
4

Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie Grecque (Paris: E. Lerous, 1899), 626. “Une fois la Terre réduite
a l’état de planète et lancée dans l’éspace, la base se dérobant, tout l’échafaudage croula du même coup. Il
n’y a d’incompatible avec l’astrologie que le systèm propose jadis par Aristarque de Samos, repris et
démonstré depuis par Copernic.” My translation. All translations from French and Latin are my own or
adapted from secondary sources unless otherwise noted. Sources of translations from all other languages
are noted in the footnotes.
5
Franz Cumont, Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans (New York: Dover Publications,
1960), xi. Originally published in 1912.
6
Although now nearly a century old, Cumont’s works, particularly Astrology and Religion among the
Greeks and Romans, remain among the most authoritative books on the subject. For a more recent work
covering similar topics in ancient astrology, see also Tamsyn Barton, Ancient Astrology (London:
Routledge, 1994).
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among the Greeks and Romans, ending his work with the conclusion that “Copernicus
and Galileo” destroyed the old “eschatological ideas” evinced by religious astrology by
“overthrow[ing] the system of Ptolemy and bring[ing] down those heavens peopled by
bright beings.”7 Though he wrote nothing of the direct effects of Copernicanism on
astrology, Cumont characterized the Scientific Revolution as a shift in worldview in
which the “mysterious prestige” accorded to the stars ultimately gave way to the
“celestial mechanics” of modern astronomy.8
By the 1920s, heliocentrism’s role in the downfall of scientific astrology was
taken for granted by most historians. For example, in his now classic Medieval Attitude
toward Astrology, Theodore Otto Wedel wrote that “the final disproof of astrology was
never written,” arguing that as long the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian model of the cosmos
dominated the universities, “refutation was impossible.”9 Examining the decline of the
Ptolemaic-Aristotelian version of the cosmos, which began with Copernicus, Wedel
assumed that all fields of study using the geocentric theory ceased to function when those
foundations were removed. Wedel added that “with the arrival of the new astronomy of
Copernicus, [refutation] was no longer necessary.”10 Similarly, Christopher Macintosh
considered the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo to have “rendered obsolete the
cosmology on which astrology was based.”11 This traditional history, however, is wrong.
Astrology remained a respected component of a typical early modern higher education
7

Cumont, Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans, 202.
Ibid., xvi.
9
Wedel, The Medieval Attitude toward Astrology, 89.
10
Ibid.
11
Christopher Macintosh, The Astrologers and their Creed: An Historical Outline (New York: Frederick
Praeger, 1969), 77.
8
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for well over a century after Copernicus’s death and successfully incorporated the
heliocentric theory.
Not all historians unquestioningly accepted this traditional assessment of the
decline and ultimate failure of astrology nor did they note Copernicus or the Scientific
Revolution as its principal undoing. As early as 1954, George Sarton issued a direct
statement challenging this view, arguing that “the claims of astrology are independent of
whether the earth or the sun is placed at the center” and reminding historians of science
that “astrology did not disappear after the acceptance of the Copernican system but
continued to grow abundantly.”12 Similarly, although Keith Thomas in his influential
1971 work Religion and the Decline of Magic repeated the conventional wisdom that “the
intellectual pretentions of astrological theory were irreparably shattered” by the
Copernican revolution, he qualified this assessment with the caveat that “heliocentrism
was consistent with astrology” because the stars still exerted an influence over the earth
no matter its position in the heavens—all that this new conceptual strategy required was a
new set of calculations.13 However, since Thomas’s primary historical interests revolved
around the social and religious implications of the rise of modern scientific thinking on
popular beliefs, he proceeded no further with this line of thinking.
Finally, the writings of Eugenio Garin in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while
repeating many of the same arguments of Sarton and Thomas, attempted to integrate the
12

George Sarton, Ancient Science and Modern Civilisation (New York: Harper, 1959), 61. This book is
made up of lectures Sarton delivered as part of the ongoing Montgomery Lecture series. The above quote
comes from a lecture delivered at the University of Nebraska in 1954. See also Eugenio Garin, Astrology in
the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life, trans. Carolyn Jackson and June Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, Ltd., 1983), first published as Lo Zodiaco della Vita, x.
13
Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Century England (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1971), 349.
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history of astrology and particularly Renaissance astrology into the broader history of the
Scientific Revolution. His most influential work Astrology in the Renaissance stands as a
late addition in the backlash against the teleological progressivism of early- and midtwentieth century histories of science. Historiographically, it also cautions of the dangers
of what Maurice Mandelbaum called the “retrospective fallacy,” a presentist bias in
which the accomplishments of science in the past are judged historically important in
proportion to their later corroboration.14 Since modern historians viewed astrology as
unscientific in the present, this preconception found its way into their assessment of
astrology in the past. On the other hand, Garin argued for a great degree of continuity
between medieval and early modern science, and used the Copernican impact on
astrology as evidence of this point. He wrote that “if, after Copernicus had completely
revolutionised the structure of the cosmos, and Kepler and Graz had still to adapt
themselves once again to casting horoscopes, this only means that the origins of modern
science did not come from either a radical break or from an instantaneous
enlightenment.”15 To Garin, the continued existence of practicing astrologers after the
Copernican revolution not only showed that the new cosmology could assimilate
astrology but also disproved the very idea of a “revolution” in science. Nevertheless,
none of these three scholars tackled the problem of how Copernicus or Copernican
mathematics specifically affected the practice of astrology, confining their interpretations
to the philosophical, religious, and cultural consequences of such a shift in worldview.
14

See David B. Wilson, “The Historiography of Science and Religion,” in Science and Religion: A
Historical Introduction, ed. Gary B. Ferngren (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 23; and
Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
15
Garin, Astrology in the Renaissance, 9.
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The only scholar to directly address the impact of the Copernican theory on
astrological practice was Mary Ellen Bowden. In her 1974 work The Scientific Revolution
in Astrology, Bowden averred that astrology failed not due to anything intrinsically
wrong with the system or to changes wrought by the new science of Copernicus, Galileo
and Newton, but because it failed to undergo a revolution in the way that astronomy and
physics did during this same period. Bowden explicitly argued that neither heliocentrism
nor telescopic evidence proving the heavens were no longer immutable undermined the
task of astrological reformers. Her research demonstrated how mathematical astrologers
used empirical, experimental, and observational evidence to reform astrology during the
Scientific Revolution. However, while Bowden focused on how the attempt at revolution
failed, it is my intention to examine how practicing mathematical astrologers received the
new Copernican mathematical models for the positions of the planets and how it affected
their status as legitimate scientists. Given the resilience of astrology in the face of what,
from the modern, rational perspective, seem to be insurmountable scientific obstacles, the
impact of Copernicanism on early modern mathematical astrology deserves a more
nuanced approach than it has received in these previous works.
Discussion of the issue of Copernicanism and its effects on astrology must
contend with problems of indefinite terminology and the multiplicity of meanings of the
term “astrology.” By the modern definition, astrology attempts to interpret the meaning
of the positions and movements of celestial bodies, which are believed to have certain
influences over the earth, in order to prognosticate future events or determine the
characters or dispositions of human beings. During the early modern era, however, the
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modern categories of astronomy and astrology were completely intertwined. Astrology,
or astrologia, was the general term used to describe the study of the stars during this
period.16 This included two categories: judicial astrology and natural astrology. The
natural branch of astrology dealt with the positions of the sun, moon, planets, and stars
and the physical influences they exerted over the material world, including the change of
the seasons, the prediction of eclipses, the positions and paths of the planetary orbits,
meteor showers, the coming of comets, tides, and so on.17 This knowledge—today
classified broadly under the category of astronomy—contributed to the increased
accuracy of calendars, indicated the best times for the planting and harvesting of crops,
and improved navigation. On the other side, judicial astrologers studied the physical
influence that the heavenly bodies exerted over people. This included the prognostication
of major historical events, the preparation of horoscopes, the determination of auspicious
moments for embarking on journeys, and the like.18 In short, astrology could be used as

16

I have attempted to retain traditional medieval and early modern terminology by referring to “astrology”
as any area of study that has to do with the stars, regardless of whether or not it the foretelling of the future
is involved. Astronomy and astrology did not distinguish themselves from one another until the late in the
Scientific Revolution. “Astrology” encompassed both judicial astrology and natural astrology. Natural
astrology and astronomy can be used interchangeably when they refer only to the study of the stars without
regards to the influences they pose on human decision making, fate, and free will.
17
David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450 (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1992), 274.
18
Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science, 274; Tester, History of Western Astrology, 19 and 123;
Wedel, Medieval Attitude toward Astrology, 27.The Greeks of the fourth and third centuries B.C.E. used
the term astrologia to describe both the study of the movements of the heavens and the use of those
movements to foretell future events, and this term remained intact into the early modern period.
Astronomia, the origin of the English word astronomy, was rare in antiquity, and there was no clear attempt
to distinguish them until Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (ca. 630). Isidore defined astronomia as the study
of the movements of the heavens and the naming of the stars and planets, while astrologia was divided into
the physical study of the stars and planets, which remained virtually indistinct from astronomia, and the
superstitious study, which he referred to as mathematici. The term mathematici was often employed to
indicate those who prophesied by the stars during the late medieval and early modern era.
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an umbrella term under which any discipline related to the study of the stars could be
placed.
The dichotomization of astronomy and astrology into separate categories is
instead a modern invention that does not characterize their relationship in the sixteenth
century, and early sixteenth-century astrologers were often experts in “astronomical”
knowledge. In the early modern era, judicial astrology required knowing the precise
location of the sun, moon, and planets relative to the stars and the constellations. There
were various forms of judicial astrology, which required knowledge of planetary
positions at different times. For natal, or horoscopic, astrology, the positions of the
celestial bodies at a subject’s birth were necessary to make predictions. For horary
astrology, astrologer-astronomers required the positions of these heavenly bodies at the
time a particular question was asked, while electional astrology depended on knowledge
of the future position of the stars and planets in order to determine the most propitious
moment to get married or wage war.19 Typically, rather than observing the heavens
themselves, practicing astrologer-astronomers

consulted tables which provided

information on the location of celestial bodies at given times and places. Since the second
century C.E., these tables had been prepared using the method of calculation developed
by Ptolemy, an adherent of the geocentric model of the cosmos, whose Almagest and
Tetrabiblos formed the backbone of early modern astronomy and astrology.20

19

Benson Bobrick, The Fated Sky: Astrology in History (New York: Simon and Schuster Press, 2005), 2226.
20
Lindberg, 274-5; Tester, 12-13.
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However, because Ptolemy’s system was limited in its accuracy, the resulting
tables contained errors which, while minuscule in the short term, accumulated over the
course of several centuries. By the thirteenth century, Ptolemy’s calculations were off by
as much as two degrees of arc or four times the width of the moon.21 While four times the
width of the moon, or eight minutes, may seem trivial, it was enough to change sun and
moon signs for some individuals born on the cusp between zodiacal signs or skew the
results of electional astrology, which depended on knowing the precise time to complete
a particular task. Furthermore, Ptolemy calculated the precession of the equinox at one
degree for every one hundred years, rather than the actual figure of one degree per
seventy-two years. Precession caused the ecliptic to slowly move westward against the
fixed stars at this rate, causing the actual position of the ecliptic relative to the zodiac to
be off by more than six degrees. Several attempts to rectify these calculations were
made—most notably the Alfonsine tables, which were constructed between 1252 and
1270—but by the opening of sixteenth century, astrologers realized that the Ptolemaic
system required more than merely revision.22
The new Copernican model of the cosmos provided more precise calculations for
the positions of the planets, and many astrologer-astronomers used these calculations in
order to maintain the scientific legitimacy they already possessed. Many judicial
astrologers valued precision, in the sense of more reliable and more repeatable
21

Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western
Thought, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 68-77; Thomas, Religion and the Decline of
Magic, 288; Nicholas Campion, A History of Western Astrology, Vol. 2: The Medieval and Modern Worlds
(London: Continuum Books, 2010), 106-111. See also James Evans, The History and Practice of Ancient
Astronomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 262-266; and Bobrick, The Fated Sky, 23.
22
Owen Gingerich, “Alfonso X as a Patron of Astronomy,” in Alfonso X of Castile, the Learned King
(1221-1284) (Harvard Studies in Romance Languages 43, 1990), 345.
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predictions of the positions of the heavenly bodies, just as much as the ability of
astrologers to make dependable predictions about human affairs. In this way, the
Copernican system made judicial astrology measurable and repeatable—and hence more
“scientific”—in that knowledge of the locations of stars and planets became more
precise, even though these did not necessarily lead to more accurate predictions of human
events. As Theodore Porter has argued, “there is a strong incentive to prefer precise and
standardizable measures to highly accurate ones” because “accuracy is meaningless if the
same operations and measurements cannot be performed” elsewhere.23 When applied to
early modern judicial astrology, this suggests that accurate prognostication would be
difficult to define if the methods used to arrive at these predictions did not employ the
most precise observational data. Eventually, precision regarding the positions of the
planets became “standardizable” as Copernican—and later Keplerian and Galilean—
astronomy rendered these calculations repeatable. Perhaps most importantly, predictions
of the positions of the planets were convincing to patrons for whom practical results were
becoming the defining standard of value. In the words of Stephen Pumphrey and Frances
Dawbarn, “patrons…wanted proof” as their criteria for acceptable scientific practice, and
by that standard, the Copernican theory did contribute to astrological legitimacy.24
English astrologer-astronomers during roughly the century between the
publication of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus and the Civil War stand out as a
particularly pertinent case study because their burgeoning interest in practical,
23

Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995), 29.
24
Stephen Pumfrey and Frances Dawbarn, “Science and Patronage in England, 1570-1625: A Preliminary
Study,” History of Science, Vol. 42 (2004): 141.
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mathematical methods was reinforced by the pragmatic tendencies of the English court
patronage system. Patronage systems in early modern Europe have been classified, in the
terminology of Pumfrey and Dawbarn, as either “utilitarian” or “ostentatious.”25 The
purpose of the ostentatious model was to exalt the cultural prestige of the patron.
Utilitarian patronage, on the other hand, existed to benefit the patron in tangible ways: to
increase their financial wealth, enhance their prowess on the battlefield, or improve
navigational aptitude for their overseas ventures. Judicial astrology could exist
comfortably within either patronage system depending on the practitioner or the patron.
While the continental model of patronage, particularly in the Holy Roman Empire and the
Italian city-states, prized the ostentatious system, the English court embraced the
utilitarian.26 Because many English judicial astrologers successfully argued for scientific
legitimacy based on their ability to precisely predict planetary locations, English patrons
regarded their services as a practical utility that conformed to the methodology of
science. I will argue that as utilitarian patronage came to dominate the English system in
the sixteenth century, astrologers used Copernican precision to gain status as scientific
and attract the attention of patrons. Among early modern English scientists, it eventually
became a problem that post-Copernican precision in the prediction of planetary locations
25

Ibid., 137.
For examples of the ostentatious patronage system, see especially, Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier: The
Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Paula
Findlen, Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, and Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1994); and William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of
Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Less work
has been done on the more utilitarian system. One good introduction is Bruce T. Moran, ed., Patronage and
Institutions: Science, Technology, and Medicine at the European Court, 1500-1750 (Suffolk, UK: Boydell
Press, 1991). See especially, Lesley B. Cormack, “Twisting the Lion’s Tail: Practice and Theory at the
Court of Prince Henry of Wales,” 67-84; David S. Lux, “The Reorganization of Science, 1400-1750,” 185194; and A.J.G. Cummings and Larry Stewart, “The Case of the Eighteenth-Century Projector:
Entrepreneurs, Engineers, and Legitimacy at the Hanoverian Court in Britain,” 235-261.
26
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did not lead to greater accuracy in the prognostication of human events. However, since
human events were so difficult to quantify, judicial astrologers eager to make their
practice scientific ignored this in favor of what could be reliably measured. This changed
when the focus of scientific activity moved beyond the English courts to the universities
and Royal Society and judicial astrology became the domain of the popular classes in the
second half of the seventeenth century. Then, it was in the interest of practicing scientists
to distance themselves from astrology and redefine it as outside the boundaries of
legitimate science.
This study examines the impact of Copernicanism on judicial astrology within the
English court patronage system between the introduction of heliocentrism to England in
1540s through roughly the reign of Charles I, though I will place significant focus on the
Elizabethan and Jacobean eras. While this may seem like an arbitrary place to end this
study, the main reasons for limiting it in this way is because the patronage system on
which I focus began to decline in importance following the Restoration in 1660 as the
locus of scientific activity shifted from noble courts to universities and the newfound
Royal Society.27 Chapter One provides a brief history of astrology from its origins in
ancient Babylon and outlines its state at the time of Copernicus, paying particularly close
attention to the “crisis” of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century astrology—as it was described
by many writers at the time—because many of the issues of precision, accuracy, and
repeatability with which English astrologers were faced emerged out of this earlier
generation. The chapter ends with a brief retelling of the story of Copernicus’s
27
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publication of De revolutionibus, well-trodden ground to be sure, but it is necessary in
order to expand upon its particular importance within the astrological world. Chapter
Two relates the history of the reception of the heliocentric theory in England from its first
appearance in print in 1556 to its first unqualified acceptance as a physical reality in 1576
to its acceptance based on observational evidence in the 1610s. Chapter Three deals with
the appropriation of Copernican mathematics in service of astrology, specifically within
the context of the patronage system in England and the court culture of both nobles and
monarchs during the late Tudor and early Stuart ages. Finally, Chapter Four continues
this story up through the 1650s and compares mathematical astrology as it was practiced
in the courts with other institutional contexts during the same era—primarily in
universities, in almanacs, in popular culture, and among the great exchanges between
men of letters who argued for and against astrology based on their own experience within
these institutions.
Many histories of astrology that take their story through the early modern era find
it obligatory to end with a narrative of astrology’s decline and ultimate demise in the late
seventeenth century as a matter of necessity. After relating astrology’s three-and-a-half
millennia historical success, they often end on a gloomy note, describing its failures in
the late seventeenth century, or conversely, they end with a celebratory tone of scientific
triumphalism. In either case, the story simply ends. The superstition has been overcome;
the light of rationality has finally shone through. The formula for writing historically
about astrology usually ends long before the modern era, and it ends in failure.

14

In a sense, for this paper, I have turned this formula on its head, instead beginning
with astrology’s failures and ending my own narrative with its greatest successes, or at
least its re-categorization into a field that allowed it to find success outside of the
scientific mainstream. By failures, I mean the difficulties in mathematical and
observational precision with which astrologers had to contend in the early modern era,
and by success, I refer to astrology’s rise in popularity among the newly literate classes of
the mid-seventeenth century just as it was being abandoned by scientists for being
unscientific. Failure, however, is too strong a word. Astrology did not fail—it merely
ceased to be a science.

15

CHAPTER ONE
FROM PTOLEMY TO COPERNICUS:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL ASTROLOGY

Astrology has a long and complex history, and it will be useful to track its
development from its origins in second millennium B.C.E. Mesopotamia to the
Renaissance era of “crisis” before describing the impact of Copernicanism on its practice.
From the end of the Roman Empire until the Later Middle Ages, most objections to
astrology were religiously motivated, and in general, revolved around the issue of
preserving the free will of the individual and the power of God over the world. By the
fourteenth century, skeptical scholars began to attack it for its lack of scientific rigor and
its failure to properly use mathematics. It was into this intellectual climate that
Copernicus emerged as an astronomer concerned with constructing a mathematically
precise model of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and while he appears to have
had little interest in astrology, the problems that astrologers faced during his lifetime
were the same ones he tackled when he set out to revise the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian
system.
Astrology had many independent origins chronologically and geographically, but
the Western version had its foundations as an organized discipline in Babylonian
Mesopotamia around 1800 B.C.E. and arose simultaneously with the Babylonian creation
of the first star charts in global history.28 Generally speaking, astrology enjoyed
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unquestioned legitimacy in ancient Mesopotamia because it grew out of both the
Babylonian religious tradition and the astronomical tradition. The Babylonian religion
considered the stars and planets divine, and this religious devotion to the heavens led to
meticulous study. Because of this integration of religious and scientific ideas about the
power of the planets, Babylonians believed that the heavenly bodies exerted influences
over human affairs.29
Although the foundations of Babylonian astrology had been laid in the second
millennium B.C.E., for nearly a thousand years, Babylonian astrology remained entirely
“mundane,” meaning that astrologers predicted only events for nations or the world at
large, rather than casting horoscopes for individuals.30 Babylonian astronomers were able
to predict the positions of the sun and moon and the dates of eclipses with a great deal of
accuracy, but they were less adept at predicting the positions of the planets, and their
ability to predict the positions of the sun and moon were never applied in any technical
sense to draw individual horoscopes.31 The most important concern in the Babylonian
version of astrology was to create accurate calendars, which served religious or
ceremonial purposes.32 An interest in planetary motion and the ability to determine their
locations with some degree of precision finally began to emerge in Mesopotamia around
the eighth century B.C.E., and this form of astrology made its way westward to the
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ancient Greeks over the next several centuries.33 The mathematical techniques and
observational precision necessary for constructing tables indicating the positions of
heavenly bodies, drawing nativities, and casting horoscopes—those things now most
associated with astrology—materialized around the fourth century in Greece.34 Though
the Babylonians had begun this process, their lack of interest in the movement of the
planets meant that the methods of later medieval and early modern astrology were not
present in the ancient Near East and did not emerge until the Hellenistic era.
Hellenistic astrology, which would develop and expand upon the techniques of
charting stars, drawing nativities, and casting horoscopes, laid the groundwork for the
type of astrology that would flourish for nearly two millennia in Europe.35 Although their
founders showed little interest in the practice of astrology, Pythagorean, Platonic, and
Aristotelian schools of thought, in their later forms, all came to accommodate astrological
discourse within their cosmologies.36 All of the major precepts of astrology were
logically consistent with these worldviews and within these frameworks, particularly the
Aristotelian conception of the cosmos, astrology was able to thrive. From the Hellenistic
era to the early modern era, the principles of astrology became intertwined with
Aristotelian cosmology and this cosmological schema provided a system within which
astrology made sense.
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Aristotle’s cosmos consisted of concentric spheres with the earth at the center and
a sphere of fixed stars at the outermost reaches. Physical laws acted differently depending
on an object’s position within the cosmos. The supralunar sphere, the entire universe
above the moon, was an incorruptible, unchangeable realm where all movement was
perfectly circular and, in general, predictable. Birth, generation, decay, and death, on the
other hand, characterized the sublunar region. It was a world of transience.37 The
predictability of the movements of the stars and planets in the supralunar sphere, the
obvious parallels between the movement of the sun across the ecliptic and the changing
of the seasons, and the relationship between the moon and the tides, among other things,
led astrologers to the conclusion that the heavens exerted an enormous influence over all
aspects of the sublunar sphere.38 Moreover, the general predictability of events in the
supralunar sphere, combined with their observed impact on the sublunar sphere, caused
astrologers to envision a relationship between the upper and lower spheres suggesting
that the heavens were the key to predicting all sublunar activity. As events in the heavens
became more predictable, astrologers believed that this knowledge could be employed to
make the sublunar realm more predictable as well.
As Aristotelian natural philosophy was adopted by the Romans throughout the
last two centuries before Christ, astrological writings flourished, and astrologers took
Aristotelian physical and geocentric cosmology as the underpinning of their astrology.
During the early empire, especially in Eastern, Hellenistic scholarly centers such as
37
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Alexandria, a number of astrological texts were produced that began to form an orthodox
version of astrology. For example, Marcus Manilius’s Astronomicon (ca. 10 C.E.), an
astrological textbook written in Greek hexameter verse, provided the first account of the
signs of the zodiac as they are known today, as well as the first account of casting
horoscopes based on planetary positions within these “houses.”39 Dorotheus of Sidon’s
didactic five-part poem the Pentateuch (ca. 75 C.E.) delineated the different varieties of
astrology, dividing its practice for the first time into natal, hoary, and electional varieties.
Vettius Valen’s encyclopedic compilation, the Anthology (ca. 150 C.E.), provided
numerous techniques for forecasting horoscopes and included several example
horoscopes and natal charts. The most important work—both at the time and in later
centuries—was the Tetrabiblos by the Hellenized Egyptian Ptolemy (90-168 C.E.), which
became the cornerstone of astrology in the medieval and early modern eras.40 In
conjunction with Ptolemy’s other great work, the Almagest, which described the
geocentric universe mathematically, the Tetrabiblos constituted a formidable edifice of
astrological authority.41
Within the Tetrabiblos, Ptolemy treated astrology hierarchically, beginning with
the general and working toward the particular. Book I offered procedural rules for
prognostication, describing the movement of the planets and stars, the use of calculations,
and how to understand the results. Book II detailed the collective aspects of astrology
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generally applicable to large populations or nations, and Books III and IV together
offered more specific details of individual astrology, or those things which may be
determined by the positions of the stars and planets at the conception, birth, and other
important moments in the life of the person whose horoscope has been cast.42 The
Tetrabiblos achieved popularity in part because, unlike some other Hellenistic works on
astrology, it did not delve into the complicated mathematics astrology had developed by
the first century C.E. but rather presented a history of astrology and systematized and
simplified the great mass of detailed information about the science.43 However,
Ptolemy’s Almagest, which provided the requisite astronomical data for the astrological
topics presented in the Tetrabiblos, delivered the specific corresponding mathematical
information needed to calculate the positions of the planets and stars in order to put the
Tetrabiblos into practice.44 Ptolemy defined astrology in terms that made it wholly
natural and scientific, consciously eliminating the “mystical” elements it retained in other
versions. In fact, he rejected much of the traditional astrology that had been popular
during the Hellenistic era.
In the Tetrabiblos, astrology emerged as a mathematical, natural science
intimately connected to the Aristotelian worldview, and the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian
cosmos that arose in the first century C.E. became the dominant astronomical and
astrological system until the sixteenth century. Moreover, Ptolemy defined astrology in a
way that promoted it as a science as opposed to a divinatory or semi-religious practice.
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“As for the nonsense on which many waste their labor and of which not even a plausible
account can be given,” Ptolemy wrote, referring to those whose adherence to astrology
was motivated by religious devotion, “this we shall dismiss in favor of the primary
natural causes.”45 While Ptolemy insisted that astrology had to follow the rules of
science, he conceded that astrology was at best a conjectural rather than exact science.
However, he considered the determination of the precise positions of the heavenly bodies
as the key to making astrology scientific and making predictions as accurate as possible:
Prognostication made by persons of this class [non-scientists] must be frequently
fallacious, owing to their deficiency in science and their consequent inability to
give necessary consideration to the time and place, or to the revolutions of the
planets; all which circumstances, when exactly defined and understood, certainly
tend towards accurate foreknowledge.46
Ptolemy criticized “the scientific vanity” of those astrological practitioners who
attempted to prognosticate without the use of accurate star charts because “they receive
no confirmation from nature” and their techniques “are not capable of being rationally
demonstrated.”47 Without prognostication based on the scientific observation of the stars,
Ptolemy regarded any astrology as illegitimate and incapable of rendering accurate
predictions of human events.
Ptolemy’s purpose in writing the Tetrabiblos was to place astrology within the
cosmological framework of Aristotelianism and the philosophical framework of
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Stoicism.48 The philosophy of Stoicism, which was at its peak during the first century
C.E., aligned with astrology quite well. Its insistence on the power of fate, the
deterministic nature of the universe, and the individual’s ability to adjust his will to be in
harmony with this universe mirrored the type of astrology that Ptolemy attempted to
cultivate. With astrology as a scientific enterprise, practitioners could attain some
knowledge to gain control over the uncontrollable and inexorable forces of the universe.
And with the procedural rules of the Tetrabiblos and the observations and calculations of
Almagest, the dual studies of astrology and astronomy rested firmly on a geocentric,
Ptolemaic-Aristotelian foundation for the next fifteen hundred years.
With the Christianization of Europe and the dissolution of the Roman Empire,
astrology, like much other learning in the Latin West, became dormant. The Christian
attitude toward astrology was varied and ranged from qualified approval to outright
rejection. Typically, Christian arguments against astrology consisted of general
complaints that as a pagan science, practicing astrology amounted to a form of heresy.
The other principal complaint was that astrology contravened free will, which was
crucially important for Christians who believed that it was through individual free will
that Christians could choose to follow Christ.49
In spite of these complaints, astrology survived and gained some degree of
respectability in the new Christian intellectual environment of medieval Europe. By the
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fifth century, the seven liberal arts had ascended to prominence as the essential
educational curriculum for the clergy.50 The seven liberal arts consisted of the trivium of
grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, followed by the more advanced quadrivium of
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. The science of astrology survived as a
subfield of astronomy in the medieval curriculum.51 Furthermore, as medieval historian
Valerie Flint has argued, astrology survived in the early Middle Ages precisely because it
could be employed to combat what many Christian authorities considered even more
dangerous forms of magic. Flint claims that astrology was rehabilitated during the Middle
Ages because it was “Christianized” and used against what Christian thinkers perceived
to be far more dangerous challenges to the Church, such as witchcraft, demonology, or
the use of illicit magic.52 The mathematical practice of astrology and the technical
knowledge required to fully understand it exercised the mind to a high degree, which
appealed greatly to early medieval clerics who emphasized the more ascetic life of the
monasteries. Additionally, the use of astronomical data was essential for calculating the
canonical hours of prayer and dates of moveable feasts such as Easter. This assured that
the framework of astrology remained intact throughout the Middle Ages.
Although astrology retained this respectability, it was criticized on religious
grounds. The Christian writers of the first few centuries after Christ, especially the
Church Fathers and Augustine of Hippo in particular, urged new Christians to abandon
old pagan superstitions such as astrology in favor of free will and the option of salvation
50
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through Christ. Augustine had dabbled in many philosophies in the personal quest that
would eventually lead him to Christianity, including Manichaeism and Greek skepticism,
both of which were more receptive to astrology. Augustine criticized astrology on
religious grounds, arguing that “a devout Christian must avoid astrologers and all
impious soothsayers, especially when they tell you the truth, for fear of leading his soul
into error by consorting with demons and entangling himself with the bonds of such
association.”53 Significantly, in his denunciation, Augustine also appealed to reason and
logic to counter the argument for astrology. Twins, he wrote, were by definition born at a
time when the stars should rule over them in identical ways and that if astrology were a
valid science then we should expect to see them live their lives with comparable
personalities, social statuses, and fates. However,
[The astrologers] have never been able to explain why twins are so different in
what they do and achieve, in their professions and skills, in the honors they
receive, and in other aspects of their lives and deaths. In all such matters, twins
are often less like each other than complete strangers; yet, twins are born with
practically no interval of time between their births and are conceived in precisely
the same moment of a single sexual semination.54
Augustine attributed the occasional success of astrologers to simple luck and said “that
guesswork was often borne out of mere chance. If an astrologer made a great many
predictions, several of them would later prove to be true, but he could not know it at the
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time and would only hit upon them by chance.”55 Augustine argued, with reference to
Hippocrates, that the more likely explanation for the similarity in the life twins was that
they shared similar medical circumstances “since their parents’ condition at the time of
conception could easily affect the embryos, and it would be no wonder if the twins should
be born with the same kind of health, since they had developed in the same way in their
mother’s womb.”56 In other words, there were many explanations to account for
similarities among individuals born at the same time that did not require resorting to
astrological influence.
Despite his unwavering dismissal of astrology as way to foretell the future,
Augustine, like most other Christian thinkers with a classical education, affirmed that the
stars could in fact have an influence on the earth and the material of the sublunar sphere
and that this could affect man insomuch as man was subject to the happenings of nature.
“It is not absurd to say, with reference only to physical differences,” wrote Augustine,
that there are certain sidereal [stellar] influences. We see that seasons of the year
change with the approach and the receding of the sun. And with the waxing and
waning of the moon, we see certain kinds of things grow and shrink, such as sea
urchins and oysters, and the marvelous tides of the ocean. But the choices of the
will are not subject to the positions of the stars.57
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Man’s will was untouchable, but his body, being simply matter, was susceptible to
astrological authority. Augustine consciously demarcated natural and judicial astrology in
his criticism, allowing for the former while condemning the latter. The basis of
Augustine’s argument—that judicial astrology flouted Christian free will—became
standard among those who attacked astrology throughout the Middle Ages, and many
astrologers went to great lengths to demonstrate that their astrological predictions
allowed for free will. Provided that they avoided this trapping and properly qualified
astrology to acquiesce to free will, astrologers continued to practice largely unabated
throughout the Middle Ages.
By the fourteenth century, astrology was practiced as a science at royal courts and
in universities but had begun to come under attack by skeptical scholars on scientific as
well as theological grounds.58 Beginning in the Later Middle Ages, the terms of the
controversy transformed into a scientific debate about the legitimacy of astrology’s
mathematical techniques. For example, Nicole Oresme, an especially vociferous
opponent of judicial astrology, argued that natural astrology was grounded in
mathematics, but complained that judicial astrologers rarely applied this to their practice.
In his Livre de Divinacions of ca. 1365, Oresme, like Augustine, acknowledged that
“[natural] astrology is speculative and mathematical, a very noble and excellent science
and set forth in the books [of astrology] very subtly, and this part can be adequately
known,” but he argued that using this knowledge to make prognostications about human
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events was futile because the positions of the heavenly bodies “cannot be known
precisely and with punctual exactness, as I have shown in my treatise on the
Measurements of the Movements of the Heavens and have proved by reason founded on
mathematical demonstration.”59 Oresme continued that not only did astrologers lack the
necessary mathematical precision to apply planetary positions to foretelling future events,
but also that those that were known were outdated:
We know too little about it and in particular the rules in the book are false…and
have either slight proof or none. And some of them which were fulfilled in the
place or at the time when they were laid down are false in other places or at the
present time: for the fixed stars which according to the ancients have great
influence are not now in the position that they were in then and these same
positions are used in making predictions.60
Oresme claimed that lack of rigor and scientific precision was exactly what made
astrology such an illegitimate discipline in the first place, since “the rules of astrology are
based on poetry and rhetoric” rather than on hard, mathematical science.61 Oresme
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attacked astrology on the grounds that it lacked the mathematical precision necessary to
determine exactly where the heavenly bodies were at any given time, and this meant that
astrologers’ “predictions…were variable and discordant.”62 Since “the disposition of the
heavens cannot be completely known” according to Oresme, then these “fables and
imaginings…cannot be accepted as a natural science.”63 Without experimental,
observational, or mathematical proof, Oresme concluded that judicial astrology was not a
science. The criticism that astrology was too imprecise mathematically to be considered a
legitimate science became a typical approach to denouncing it up to the time of
Copernicus.
Perhaps the most scathing critique of astrology written during the early modern
era, and certainly among the most influential throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, was the Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem by the Italian
humanist philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.64 While Pico seems to have been
motivated by his concerns that astrology was an unchristian practice, his attack
thoroughly covered all of the major arguments against astrology, including a lengthy
section on its unscientific basis and its lack of mathematical precision. Interestingly, Pico
approved of magic, which he defined as man’s harnessing the power of the universe,
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while he deplored astrology because he considered it man’s submission to the will of the
universe.65 He spent much of his Disputationes differentiating between the two.
Pico focused his attack primarily on judicial astrology, but he asserted that
improper definitions for astrology were among its greatest problems. He confined his
critique to astrology “which foretells things to come by the stars” rather than astronomy,
which he defined as “the mathematical measurements of the stellar sizes and motion,
which is an exact and noble art.”66 However, Pico took issue with astrologers because
they took no heed of these measurements and instead relied on an amorphous set of
traditions handed down from the time of Ptolemy onward, appropriating countless
techniques and rules from various versions of Arabic, Persian, Greek, and Babylonian
astrological traditions, all of which contradicted one another. In addition, he called
astrologers of his own time “lazy” because they were content to work with “almanacs and
ephemerides…[and] believe that a planet is at a cardinal point when it is not, or that it is
not when it is,” instead of observing the heavens for themselves.67 As it was practiced in
his day, Pico argued, astrology was “the most infectious of all frauds, since...it corrupts
all philosophy, falsifies medicine, weakens religion, begets or strengthens superstition,
encourages idolatry, destroys prudence, pollutes morality, defames heaven, and makes
men unhappy, troubled and uneasy; instead of free, servile, and quite unsuccessful in
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nearly all their undertakings.”68 Rather than point out these errors of astrology in order to
generate interest in an astrological reformation, Pico simply used these examples as
reason to dismiss judicial astrology altogether.
One particular point that Pico made in the Disputationes that had a great effect on
observational astronomy and its relationship with judicial astrology regarded the ordering
of the planets.69 Pico claimed that to be able to determine the particular influence
individual planets exerted over human beings, knowledge of their proper order was
paramount. He ridiculed astrologers for their inability to agree on the correct order of the
planets, particularly Mercury and Venus. Pico quoted Plato, who in his Timaeus placed
Mercury and Venus beyond the orbit of the sun in the geocentric system, as well as the
thirteenth-century Arab astronomer Alpetragius, who placed Venus above the orbit of the
sun while moving Mercury below.70 Ptolemy had placed Mercury and Venus between the
orbits of the moon and the sun in his geocentric system. Although Ptolemy’s system was
the most influential, the order of the planets was still the topic of some debate even by the
late fifteenth century. In any case, Pico argued that because astronomer-astrologers
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disagreed with one other about the order of the planets, they could not be trusted to
understand their impact on humanity. It appears that one reader took this criticism to
heart and was motivated, at least in part, to solve this conundrum—Nicolaus Copernicus.
Copernicus’s formal university education began in 1491 at Jagiellonian
University in Cracow, where he studied the liberal arts, including astronomy. He studied
there for either three or four years, leaving sometime between 1494 and 1495 without
taking his degree in order to attend the court of his uncle Lucas Watzenrode. His uncle
had been recently ennobled and elevated to Bishop of Warmia, and it is possible that
Copernicus expected to be installed as a canon himself.71 For unknown reasons,
Copernicus’s attendance at his uncle’s court was delayed, and instead, he furthered his
schooling by enrolling in the University of Bologna in order to earn his doctorate. While
ostensibly there to attain a doctorate in canon law, Copernicus continued his studies in
astronomy and mathematics, and his time at Bologna, from 1496 to 1500, had a
significant impact on his later astronomical work and informed much of his thinking
about the positions and movements of the sun, moon, and planets. In Bologna,
Copernicus lived with his new mentor in astronomy Domenico Maria Novara de Ferrara,
the primary astronomer for the university and the most notable astrologer in the city, and
Copernicus became his assistant in making astronomical observations and calculations.72
According to Copernicus’s later disciple and earliest supporter Georg Joachim Rheticus,
Copernicus claimed that he was “not so much the pupil” of Novara as he was an
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“assistant and witness of the observations of Domenicus Maria,” and Copernicus
respected Novara enough as a scientist to report that he knew his “calculations
and…observations exactly.”73 It was Novara who introduced Copernicus to Pico della
Mirandola’s Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, which had been published
the year that Copernicus arrived in Bologna.74
Although there is little to no evidence to suggest that Copernicus ever practiced
astrology, it seems almost certain that he was at least aware of its operations and
techniques, even if he showed no particular interest in it.75 Novara’s position as a
professor of astronomy at Bologna required that he issue annual astrological predictions,
typically in the form of a yearly almanac, and that he publish general predictions for
favorable and ominous dates, calendars marked with the phases of the moon and
important festival days, and periodic weather reports based on his reading of the
heavens.76 This was fairly typical of university astronomers in fifteenth- and sixteenthcentury Italy. As Novara’s assistant for three years, it is likely that Copernicus was at
least exposed to the rules of its practice, and quite possible that he even aided Novara in
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his duties as Bologna’s primary astrologer. It is certainly true that Copernicus assisted
Novara in his observations of the heavens, which were accurate enough to fuel his
growing doubts about the geocentric system.77 Pico’s criticism of astrologers’ inability to
determine the proper order of the planets apparently affected Copernicus enough that, by
the time De revolutionibus was published over four decades later, he had devoted an
entire chapter to setting their order and demonstrating it mathematically within his new
heliocentric system.78
In Book One, Chapter Ten, of De revolutionibus, Copernicus argued that the
simplest method to determine the order of the planets was to base it upon the amount of
time they required to revolve around the sun. “We see that the ancient philosophers
wished to take the order of the planets according to the magnitude of their revolutions…”
Copernicus wrote, and this placed the Moon, which revolves around the earth in twentyeight days as the closest heavenly body, and Saturn, which takes nearly thirty years to
complete its cycle, as the furthest away.79 Under the geocentric system, this meant that
after the Moon, Mercury was the closest planet to the earth, then Venus, and then the sun,
which appeared to take one year to return to its original position. However, Copernicus
noted that Mercury and Venus never deviated from the sun more than twenty-four or
forty-five angular degrees, respectively, and reasoned that if the geocentric model were
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true, then we should observe Venus and Mercury beyond these constraints (see figure 1
below).80 The Ptolemaic system explained this by placing these two planets on epicycles
and centering their orbits around an imaginary line that extended from the earth to the
sun. Mercury and Venus then revolved around the earth on their epicycles at the same
speed as the sun, thus accounting for their apparent lack of further deviation from the sun
(see figure 2 below).81 Instead, Copernicus posited that if the Sun were assumed to be at
rest in the center of the cosmos and the earth were assumed to be revolving around the
sun once every year, then the earth would take a position as the third planet from the sun,
and the remaining planets would fall into place based on their revolutionary periods.
After the sphere of the fixed stars, Copernicus positioned
Saturn, the first of the wandering stars… it completes its circuit in 30 years. After
it comes Jupiter, moving a 12 year period of revolution. Then Mars, which
completes a revolution every 2 years. The place fourth in order is occupied by the
annual revolution in which we said the Earth together with the orbital cycle of the
Moon as an epicycle is comprehended. In the fifth place Venus, which completes
its revolution in 7 ½ months. The sixth and final place is occupied by Mercury,
which completes its revolution in a period of 88 days. In the center of all the rest
is the sun. For who would place this lamp of a beautiful temple in another or
better place than this wherefrom it can illuminate everything at the same time?82
While it is ultimately unknowable exactly why Copernicus developed heliocentrism when
he did, it is quite possible that Pico’s comprehensive criticism of astrologers’ and
astronomers’ failure to properly order the planets spurred Copernicus to devise a new
system that accounted for their apparent motion.83
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De revolutionibus, of course, was finally published while Copernicus was on his
deathbed in 1543. However, the first exposition of the heliocentric theory occurred nearly
forty years earlier in Copernicus’s Commentariolus of 1514, in which he outlined his
theory with minimal mathematics in just forty pages.84 This work remained unpublished
and received little attention because it was meant to be circulated among his colleagues.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the origins of his theory, which finally entered
public discourse following his death, can be traced all the way back to the first decade of
the sixteenth century, and it is possible that Copernicus began elaborating on these ideas
in private as early as 1503, just three years after he left the University of Bologna.85 In
any case, Copernicus certainly formed the concept by the time he left Italy in 1500, and
his reevaluation of Ptolemy likely drew on Pico’s criticism of astrology as well as his
own observations of the heavens with Novara.
With the publication of De revolutionibus, these new ideas about the structure of
the cosmos entered the scientific community of mid-sixteenth century Europe. Finally
convinced by his pupil Rheticus, Copernicus consented to have his magnum opus
delivered to a printer in Nuremburg, where it received an initial run of about four hundred
copies.86 From the very beginning, controversy surrounded it, but this controversy
extended to very few people at first. De revolutionibus was prefaced with a sort of
religious disclaimer by the Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander warning that
Copernicus’s hypotheses “need not be true or even probable” because mathematicians
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“will adopt whatever suppositions enable the motions [of the planets] to be computed
correctly from the principles of geometry.”

87
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Copernicus’s or Rheticus’s knowledge. It is possible that Osiander wrote this foreword to
preempt any criticism from religious figures that heliocentrism contradicted scripture, but
it is just as likely that he included it in anticipation of the reaction of other
mathematicians and astronomers, whose Ptolemaic-Aristotelian cosmos was deeply
shaken by this work.
In De revolutionibus Copernicus explained heliocentrism in extremely technical
language with the addition of highly advanced mathematics that would have been
comprehensible only to other astronomers, mathematicians, and astrologers.88 In a sense,
the specialized nature of the knowledge Copernicus presented forestalled any substantial
negative reaction on the part of the public until decades later, and then, only once its
ideas had penetrated popular consciousness. Understanding the process of this
dissemination of knowledge across England, which contained one of the most receptive
scientific audiences, is crucial to understanding the impact of Copernicanism on judicial
astrology in the early modern courts of the Tudors and the Stuarts.
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Figure 1. In the Ptolemaic system, it should be possible to view Mercury and Venus at 180° opposite the
sun at their perigees (left). Since they never deviate more than 24° and 45°, respectively, Copernicus
argued against the Ptolemaic cosmos and order of the planet
planets.
s. In the Copernican system, the angular
distances corresponded to maximum possible distances away from the sun that either Mercury or Venus
could achieve as observed from the earth (right). Based on their orbital period
period—Mercury’s
Mercury’s 88 days and
Venus’s 224 days—Copernicus
Copernicus placed Mercury closer to the sun in his heliocentric system.
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Figure2. Ptolemy’s geocentric system explained the lack of apparent deviation for Mercury and
a Venus by
positioning these planets on epicycles and centering their orbits ar
around
ound an imaginary line that extended
from the earth to the sun. Mercury and Venus then revolved around the earth on their epicycles at the same
speed as the sun, accounting for their perceived closeness to the sun. Copernicus rejected this explanation.
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CHAPTER TWO
COPERNICANS, SEMI-COPERNICANS, AND MATHEMATICAL COPERNICANS:
THE ENGLISH REACTION TO HELIOCENTRISM

By modern standards, the process of disseminating Copernicanism across the
scientific community of Europe was achingly slow. Remarkably few Copernicans existed
between the publication of De revolutionibus in 1543 and Galileo’s telescopic
observations of the heavens in the 1609 and 1610. However, though few accepted the
physical reality of heliocentrism until after Galileo, more accepted its mathematics
without question. This was a fairly typical position among astronomers and astrologers
who adopted the Copernican system slowly and often incrementally between the 1570s
and Galileo’s telescopic observations in 1609.89 How does one define a Copernican? If
we define a Copernican only as one who definitively accepted the new sun-centered
system as a physical reality, then only ten existed from the publication of De
revolutionibus in 1543 to the turn of the seventeenth century.90 However, while only a
few astronomers and astrologers fully adopted the Copernican system in place of the
Ptolemaic, many “semi-Copernicans” accepted heliocentrism as mathematically superior
to the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system and denied or remained neutral as to its physical
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validity. In short, there was a wide variety of receptions of Copernicanism often shaped
by practical, mathematical concerns.
Before examining changes in astrological practice, it will be useful to track the
introduction of the Copernican theory into England in the mid-sixteenth century. Though
England remained somewhat intellectually isolated from continental Europe, many
English scholars attended European universities and ideas that circulated in the schools of
Europe soon found their way across the Channel. Like the continental system, the
university system in England incorporated some scientific studies—mainly physics and
mathematics—but its primary concern was Latin grammar in the earlier levels and
theology and law in the later stages.91 But by the time of Copernicus’s publication of De
revolutionibus, the royal and noble courts, not the universities, had become the center of
the most dynamic scientific activity in England.92 It was within this cultural and
institutional milieu that the heliocentric theory began to take root.
The first reference to Copernicus in England, thirteen years after the publication
of De revolutionibus, illustrates this larger setting. In his Castle of Knowledge (1556), an
elementary arithmetic textbook, the eminent English mathematician Robert Recorde
briefly considered the question concerning the “quietnes of the earth” and whether or not
“it chaunceth, that the opinion most generally receiued is not moste true.”93 Recorde
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attended Oxford in the early 1530s, earned his bachelor’s degree there in 1531, and was
elected to All Soul’s College later that year to study medicine. Though he obtained a
license to practice medicine in 1533, it appears that Recorde moved to Oxford to acquire
a doctorate of medicine in the early 1540s. There is no substantial evidence to prove that
he taught mathematics while there, but most of his later scholarly works in mathematics
bore the mark of a man who had gained a pedagogical mastery of the subject.
Recorde was among the first generation of scholars who began writing in English
for the practical benefit of the increasingly literate merchant class, and The Castle of
Knowledge served as a primer for basic Ptolemaic astronomy and arithmetical and
geometrical astronomy.94 While Latin remained the lingua franca of most scholarly texts,
the English vernacular witnessed an increase in use due, in part, to the demand for
beginners’ texts covering practical knowledge like Recorde’s Castle of Knowledge.95 As
in many of his other works, Recorde composed The Castle of Knowledge as a dialogue
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between a master and a student. The master first claims that he “neede not to spende anye
tyme in proouing” the immobility and centrality of the earth since “that opinion is so
firmelye fixed in most mennes headdes, that they accompt it mere madnes to bring the
question in doubt.”96 However, to demonstrate that the geocentric model was not as
impervious to criticism as a neophyte mathematics student might assume, Recorde’s
master invoked several ancient authorities who argued against it, including “not only
Eraclides, Ponticus, a great Philosopher, and two great clerkes of the Pythagoras schole,
Philolaus and Ecphantus…but also Nicias Syracusius, and Aristarchus Samius, [who]
seem with strong arguments to approoue” the heliocentric theory.97 The appeal to ancient
authority was, of course, a common technique among early modern writers who desired
to imbue their work with scholarly credibility, and Recorde included Copernicus as the
last in a line of natural philosophers, describing him as “a man of greate learning, of
muche experience, and of wondrefull diligence in obseruation,” who “renewed the
opinion of Aristarchus Samius, and affirmeth that the earthe not only moveth circularly
about his owne centre, but also may be, and yea is, continually out of the precise centre of
the world…”98
Despite his concision, Recorde treated the heliocentric cosmos as a valid
alternative, and the brevity of the allusion can be attributed to the rudimentary nature of
the textbook. Understanding the implications of the theory and the anticipated reception
among skeptical contemporary scholars, the student in Recorde’s dialogue reacted
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incredulously: “Nay syr in good faith, I desire not to heare such vaine phantasies, so farre
againste common reason, and repugnante to the consente of all the learned multitude of
Wryters, and therefore let it pass forever, and a day longer,” to which the master replied,
You are too yonge to be a good iudge in so great a matter: it passeth farre from
your learninge, and theirs also that are muche better learned than you, to improue
his supposition by good arguments, and therefore you are best to condemne
nothing that you do not well vnderstand but another time, as I sayd, I will so
declare his supposition, that you shall not only wonder to hear it, but also
peraduenture be as earnest then to credite it, as you are to condemne it.”99
This caveat against condemning a hypothesis before one fully understands its particulars
implies that Recorde was well aware that the last word on Copernicus had not yet been
written. In this spirit, Recorde claimed that “the reasons” for Copernicus’s theory “are
too difficult for this Introduction,” and so he “omit[ted] them for another time…because
the understanding of that controversy dependeth on profounder knowledge than in this
Introduction may be uttered conveniently….”100 Unfortunately, Recorde died two years
later without expounding upon Copernicus again.
The next mention of Copernicus in England came later in 1556 in John Dee’s
preface to John Feild’s Ephemeris. John Dee, often described as a magus, truly deserves
the appellation “Renaissance man.” During his lifetime, he was involved in nearly all
major intellectual pursuits within the domain of natural philosophy, including astrology.
Showing great promise as a young grammar school student, Dee eventually attended St.
John’s College, Cambridge, and Louvain University in Flanders where he studied under
the prominent mathematicians Gemma Frisius and Gerard Mercator from 1548 to
99
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1550.101 It is possible that he first became acquainted with the theory of Copernicus via
Frisius while at Louvain. In any case, after lecturing on mathematics in France for a year,
he returned to England in 1551 and began serving first in the court of the Earl of
Pembroke and then the Duke of Northumberland.102
The acquaintanceship between John Dee and John Feild evidently began while
both were serving prison terms. Dee, a partisan of the future Queen Elizabeth I, had been
imprisoned along with Feild in 1555 for their alleged astrological prognostication of the
fate of Queen Mary. Dee’s charge was for the “lewde and vayne practices of calculing
and conjuring,” which was considered more serious during Mary’s reign than it would be
accounted later in the Elizabethan era.103 Following her ascension to the throne, Queen
Mary feared the use of prophecy, which often accompanied rumors of rebellion. Several
predictions concerning Mary’s death circled about London in 1554, and it seems that she
took no chances with Dee or Feild.104 While imprisoned, Dee suggested that Feild model
his new planetary tables on the Prutenic tables, which were based on the observations and
calculations of Copernicus. Feild agreed and enlisted Dee to write the preface to his
work.
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Feild’s Ephemeris was an English version of the Prutenic tables, themselves based
on Copernicus’s heliocentric model. The original Prutenic tables had been published by
Erasmus Reinhold five years earlier in 1551, but they specified the location of the stars
and planets at given times based on the location of Prussia. Feild’s Ephemeris used the
same data to recalculate the tables based on the position of the stars relative to London
time.105 Dee was described by a contemporary as “a most ardent defender of the new
hypothesis and Ptolemaic doctrine.”106 His views on the physical reality of heliocentrism
remain enigmatic. On the one hand, every mention of the theory in his writings is
positive. On the other hand, he described the cosmos in Aristotelian and Ptolemaic terms
at length in his later works, the Propaedeumata aphoristica and the Monas
hieroglyphica.107 At the very least, it seems that Dee, like many of his mathematically
knowledgeable contemporaries, recognized the advantages that the Copernican theory
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provided for calculating the positions of the planets while perhaps not accepting it as a
physical or metaphysical reality.108
In his preface to Feild’s Ephemeris, Dee was clearly more concerned with the
mathematical precision of Copernicus than with the physical basis of his claims.109 He
extolled the “more than Herculean efforts” of Copernicus to “restore the heavenly
discipline” to its proper stature following the steady accretion of errors since the time of
Ptolemy. However, after praising his “radiant brilliance” and “divine studies,” Dee
contended that the preface to Feild’s work was not the proper place to discuss the import
of such a hypothesis.110 Given the limited space at his disposal, Dee may merely have
meant that a longer work would be necessary to discuss heliocentrism more fruitfully, but
his commendation of Copernicus in the preface of a work on planetary tables suggests
that the context of his praise, in this instance, was mathematical rather than physical. This
conscious differentiation is, in one sense, curious for Dee since his Hermetic,
Neoplatonic, and occult dispositions remained fully integrated with mathematical,
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astronomical, and empirical modes of thinking throughout his life.111 However, while
Dee regarded mathematics highly, he saw them merely as a means, and a subservient one
at that, to philosophical truth. For Dee, astronomical mathematics was but one of many
paths to knowledge about natural philosophy, and when it contradicted deeper truths
about the nature of the cosmos derived from ancient Hermetic texts, Dee accorded
mathematics a status secondary to the metaphysical.112
Feild, on the other hand, may not have separated his cosmological philosophy
from his mathematical understanding of the cosmos.113 Feild’s reference to Copernicus is
even briefer than Dee’s, though his adulation is no less glowing. He asserted that his
planetary tables were constructed “following the authority” of both Copernicus and
Reinhold “whose solid writings are founded on true, certain, and sincere
demonstrations.”114 However, while Feild used the Copernican system and the tables of
Reinhold to calculate the positions of the planets, he wrote no other work accepting the
heliocentric theory, and it is unclear from his writings whether by “demonstrations” he
meant mathematical or observational since both could be employed for the construction
of tables. Given his consultation of Reinhold’s tables, however, it seems likely that Feild
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referred to Copernican mathematics. In either case, the uses of the strong words “true
[and] certain” exhibit clear approval of Copernicus.
The first English scholar to unquestionably adopt the Copernican theory as a
physical reality and to substitute it for the Ptolemaic system was Thomas Digges. Digges
received no formal university education, but his father, the respected mathematician
Leonard Digges, personally instructed him in mathematics and astronomy when he was
child. In 1554, when Thomas was only eight years old, Leonard Digges participated in
Thomas Wyatt’s unsuccessful rebellion against the newly crowned Queen Mary and was
sentenced to death for his role in the insurrection. Though he avoided execution, his
property was confiscated and he spent five years attempting to regain his estates before
dying a poor man in 1559. The guardianship of Thomas passed to John Dee who acted
both as his surrogate father and mathematics mentor until Digges reached adulthood five
years later.115 Under Dee’s tutelage, Digges flourished as one of the best English
mathematicians of the 1570s and 1580s.
During these decades, several celestial events turned the eyes of England’s
astronomers and astrologers to the heavens, and Digges’s careful observations of these
events led him to rely on the Copernican system as essential to interpreting their positions
and motions. The first event was a supernova that appeared in the sky in early November
in 1572. Digges believed that by measuring the parallax of the new supernova, he could
determine whether the earth or the sphere of the fixed stars rotated once a day. In a short
treatise on the nova, Alae seu scalae mathematica, published early the next year, Digges
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wrote that the new star offered an opportunity “for proving whether the motion of the
earth set forth in the Copernican theory is the sole reason why this star is apparently
diminishing in magnitude; for if it were thus always decreasing toward the spring
equinox, it would be observed to be very small in its own magnitude.” By this method,
Digges continued,
it would not be at all difficult if this remarkable Phenomenon [the supernova]
should persist for a long time, to discern by exact judgment whether the earth lies
quiet and immoveable in the center of the World, and whether that huge mass of
moving and fixed Orbs rotates in a circle by a most rapid course in the space of 24
hours, or rather, that that immense sphere of fixed stars remains truly fixed and
that apparent motions occurs only from the circular rotation of the Earth with
reference to the celestial poles themselves. 116
Digges’s observational experiment was subjected to great criticism by Tycho Brahe in his
Astronomiae Instauratae Progymnasmata. Brahe argued that Digges only took into
account the diurnal motion of the earth and not its annual motion about the sun in his
calculations. Furthermore, a high degree of parallax would have placed the supernova
close to the earth; the fact that this was not observed placed it far beyond the orbit of
Saturn. Brahe asserted that if Copernicus was right, the supernova would be much too far
away from the earth for its location and apparent magnitude to be affected by the earth’s
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position. While Digges seems not to have realized that the diurnal parallax would have
appeared the same relative to his position on the earth whether the earth moved against a
backdrop of stationary stars or whether the firmament wheeled about an immobile and
centrally located earth, his adherence to observation as the arbiter of knowledge about the
Copernican theory shows that he was concerned with detailed collection of data.
Moreover, Digges intended to use this data not merely to better calculate the positions of
the planets but to describe the physical nature of the cosmos.117
The second celestial event to cause astronomers and astrologers to question the
conventional wisdom regarding Ptolemaic mathematics and the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian
cosmological structure was the Great Comet of 1577, which was observed and recorded
by numerous astronomers across Europe including not only Thomas Digges, but also
Michael Maestlin and Tycho Brahe.118 Unlike the supernova of 1572, which in reality
was much too far away for any discernible parallax, the comet’s close approach to the
earth allowed the most keen observers of celestial phenomena to determine within a
reasonable degree of precision the comet’s distance from the earth. The consensus among
those who had begun to doubt the efficacy of the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian cosmos was that
it was impossible for the comet to lie below the sphere of the moon, as all Aristotelians
accepted.119 Aristotelians believed in the incorruptibility of cosmos beyond the moon’s
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orbit and had attributed all observable change in the heavens to have taken place below
the sphere of the moon.120
As several observers noticed, however, if the comet were below the orbit of the
moon, it would have a high degree of parallax when in fact none was observed. For
example, Johannes Kepler, who was only six years old at the time of the comet, wrote
much later in his Mysterium Cosmographicum (1595) that his tutor Maestlin “showed me
a…reason [in support of Copernicus] by another special argument: he found that the
Comet of the year ’77 moved constantly with respect to the motion of Venus professed
by Copernicus; and he conjectured from this superlunary height that [the Comet]
completed its orbit in the same orb as the Copernican Venus,” clearly placing it beyond
the sphere of the moon.121 Similarly, in his treatise on the use of the astrolabe
Astrolabium vranicum generale (1596), John Blagrave wrote that “our late learned
countryman, Master Digges is his Scala Mathematica found, because he had no Parallax,
that the [comet] must needes be beyond the Spheere of the ☽.”122 Although this
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observation itself did not deliver a mortal blow to Ptolemaic-Aristotelian cosmology, it
did demolish the idea that the heavens above the moon were necessarily perfect and
unchangeable and that the planets were carried about by crystalline spheres, since the
comet would be required to pass through them. At the very least, it offered more
ammunition to those who believed that the Ptolemaic system required more than merely
revision.
Thomas Digges’s Alae seu scalae mathematica was written in Latin and
addressed to an international audience, but his next exposition of the Copernican theory
three years later was intended for the English masses. Beginning in 1553, Digges’s father
published an almanac entitled A Prognostication Everlastinge of Right Goode Effecte,
which contained information on weather prediction and the positions of the stars and
planets. Leonard Digges published two more editions in 1554 and 1556 before his
premature death at age 39 in 1559. Thomas Digges began publishing a revised version in
1576, in which he used Copernican “geometricall demonstrantion[s]” to correct the errors
that had accumulated in his father’s calculations to show “a perfit description of the
caelestiall orbes according to the most auncient doctrine of the Pythagoreans, lately
revived by Copernicus.”123 Even though he thought of heliocentrism as a physical reality,
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Digges still appealed to Copernicus’s mathematical demonstrations in order to make his
case:
But in this age, one rare wit (seeing the continual errors that from time to time
more & more have been discovered, besides the infinite absurdities in their
Theorickes, which they have been forced to admit that would not confess mobility
in the ball of the earth) hath by long study, painful practice, and rare invention
delivered a new Theoricke or model of the world, shewing that the earth resteth
not in the Center of the whole world…124
Digges viewed the constant, miniscule mathematical adjustments made by those
attempting to preserve the Ptolemaic model as “absurd” and concluded that that entire
enterprise was misguided.
Furthermore, in Digges’s philosophy, fixity implied a certain degree of nobility,
and the motion of the earth relegated it to what he regarded as its rightful place as a
location of sin and degradation. By moving the earth from its central location, Digges
dethroned the earth, so to speak, and the ignobility and baseness of the earth was revealed
by its reduced importance as a planet that orbited
only in the Center of this our mortal world or Globe of elements, which environed
and enclosed in the Moon’s Orb, and together with the whole globe of mortality is
carried yearly round about the Sun…[and] in respect of the immensity of that
immovable heaven, we may easily consider what little portion of God’s frame our
Elementary corruptible world is, but never sufficiently be able to admire the
immensity of the Rest.125
Digges envisioned the cosmos as an infinite kingdom, in which the sun ruled “like a king
in the middest of all” from the center of the solar system, which was its own “Celestiall
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temple.”126 The idea of the sun in a central position of authority better harmonized with
the metaphysical cosmos as Digges understood it.
Finally, though his arguments rested mostly on mathematical demonstrations,
Digges specifically rejected the notion that the Copernican theory was merely a
mathematical hypothesis designed to “save the phenomenon” of perfectly circular orbits.
Digges forcefully asserted that Copernicus “meant not, as some have fondly excused him,
to deliver these grounds on the earth’s mobility only as Mathematical principles, feigned
& not as Philosophical truly averred” but rather intended his theory to represent a
physical reality.127 Indeed, he had written in the marginalia on the title page of his own
copy of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus that “the common opinion errs.”128
After Digges’s unequivocal exposition of the Copernican theory, the
astronomical, astrological, and mathematical writers of the last quarter of the sixteenth
century typically took note of heliocentrism in their works regardless of whether they
accepted or rejected it. Certainly by the 1570s, it had become notable enough within these
circles to require some comment. For example, Thomas Blundeville, a well-respected
mathematician, logician, and Christian humanist was among the first in England to argue
against the Copernican theory on theological grounds, but he couched this within larger
arguments about its scientific legitimacy. Still, as an accomplished mathematician,
Blundeville recognized the computational advantages to the Copernican theory and only
cautioned his readers not to confuse mathematical simplification with physical reality. In
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his Exercises of 1594, an eclectic mixture of introductory material on arithmetic,
navigation, cartography, and the use of the astrolabe, Blundeville wrote of heliocentrism
that
some also deny that the earth is in the middest of the world, and some affirme that
it is mouable, as also Copernicus by way of supposition, and not for that he
thought so in deede: who affirmeth that the earth turneth about, and that the sunne
standeth still in the midst of the heauens, by help of which false superstition he
hath made truer demonstrations of the motions and reuolutions of the celestiall
Spheares than euer were made before as plainly appeareth in his booke de
Reuolutionibus dedicated to Paulus Tertias the pope, in the year of our Lord
1536.129
Despite deriving more precise mathematical positions for the planets from what he
considered a superstitious physical hypothesis, Blundeville understood the importance of
its mathematical implications. Like many of his contemporaries, Blundeville approached
Copernicanism

cautiously

and

accepted

it

piecemeal—appropriating

the

less

controversial aspects while denying others.
Unlike Digges, Blundeville refused to entertain the idea that the earth actually
moved and was most adamant in this respect, deferring to both the authority of classical
philosophers as well as scripture:
But Ptolemie, Aristotle, and all the other olde writers affirm the earth to be in the
middest and to remain imooueable and to be in the very Center of the world,
proouing the same with many most strong reasons not needful here to be
rehearsed, because I think fewe or none do doubt thereof, and especially the holy
Scripture affirming the foundations of the earth to be layd so sure that it neuer
should mooue at any time: Again you shall find in the self same Psalme these
129
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words, Hee appointeth the Moone for certain seasons, and the sunne knoweth his
going downe, whereby it appeareth that the sunne mooueth and not the earth.130
Somewhat ironically, eight years later in his Theoriques of the Seven Planets, Blundeville
named the German astronomer Michael Maestlin, a Copernican, as his chief astronomical
influence for planetary calculations. Theoriques—usually referred to as theorica—were
traditional astronomical textbooks dating back to the twelfth century similar to
ephemerides like John Feild’s Ephemeris anni 1557. However, rather than simply
providing tables with values for determining the positions of heavenly bodies at given
times and places, theorica typically included the specific calculations one needed to
master in order to predict these positions oneself.131

Blundeville, following the

mathematical models of Maestlin, which were themselves derived from Copernicus,
wrote in the introduction to his Theoriques that
I thought I could not shew myself more thankfull vnto them [the court of the Earl
of Leicester] than by setting forth the Theoriques of the planets, which I have
collected, partly out of Ptolemy, and partly out of Puerbachius, and of his
commentator Reinhold, also out of Copernicus, but mostly out of Mestelyn,
whom I have chiefly followed because his method and order of writing greatly
contenteth my humor.132
Maestlin taught traditional Ptolemaic astronomy at the University of Tübingen, but he
adhered fully to heliocentrism in his research and writing by at least the 1590s, even if he
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was reticent to publish any polemics against Ptolemaic astronomy.133 Blundeville’s
invocation of him, along with other luminaries of the astronomical canon, demonstrates
not only his reliance on numerous historical astronomers for his calculations but also his
ability to accept Copernican mathematics without accepting its physical reality.
The final important figure in the reception of Copernicanism in England before
the 1610s was Thomas Harriot. Harriot was remarkable yet enigmatic figure in the
history of science. Called “the English Galileo” by his most authoritative biographer John
W. Shirley, Harriot became most famous for his telescopic observations of the contours
of the moon’s surface and sunspots, which he called “frost & a mist [on] the sonne” some
four months prior to the same discoveries by Galileo.134 However, Harriot’s precarious
position at court during the first decade of the seventeenth century, which we shall
examine in more detail in the next chapter, made it difficult for him to achieve any
recognition for his scientific works during his lifetime.
Harriot’s role in the reception of Copernicanism in England was at once important
and negligible—it was important in that he was the last major figure to fully support
Copernicanism before Galileo’s observations provided, for the first time, physical
evidence for Copernicanism, and because Harriot’s own observations helped convince
him of heliocentrism. However, he attained only marginal scientific status and exerted
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little influence over other scholars because he was an intensely private and timid scholar
after his brief incarceration in the Tower of London in 1605.135 Harriot remained
relatively obscure because he published only one work during his lifetime, A Briefe and
True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia. This ethnographic description of the
Algonquian people and language, which he made during his 1585-6 voyage to the coast
of modern-day Virginia and North Carolina, contained no indication of his astronomical
or mathematical beliefs despite the fact that these pursuits were his primary professional
concern.136 His only other published work was the Artis Analyticae Praxis, which came
ten years after his death, and it contained no insight into his opinion on Copernicanism.
The main clues to Harriot’s acceptance of the heliocentric theory came in the
letters he exchanged with several other scientists, including, most notably, Johannes
Kepler. However, Harriot’s correspondence with his pupil Sir William Lower revealed
the most about his opinions on astronomy. Unfortunately, all of Harriot’s letters to Lower
have disappeared, but nine letters from Lower to Harriot remain, and they present a
picture of Harriot as highly knowledgeable in mathematics, optics, and observational
astronomy but reserved in his demeanor and uninterested in the kind of glory-seeking that
often typified upwardly mobile courtiers during this time period.137 Lower rarely
mentioned Copernicus himself, and instead, most of the references that shed light on
Harriot’s attitude toward the heliocentric theory occurred as discussions of the various
observational details that supported this viewpoint. Lower, who professed to Harriot that
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he was “wholly possessed with astronomical speculations and desires,” received an early
telescope from Harriot in 1610 and immediately recognized how essential it would
become to astronomy in the future.138 Following Harriot’s instructions, Lower used a
telescope to observe the details of moon’s surface. “I have received the perspective
cylinder [telescope] that you promised me,” Lower wrote to Harriot,
[and] according as you wished I have observed the moon in all its changes. In the
new I manifestly discover the earth shine, a little before the Dichotomy, that spot
which represents unto me the Man in the Moon (but without a head) is first to be
seen. A little after near the brim of the gibbous parts toward the upper corner
appear luminous parts like stars but much brighter than the rest and the whole
brim along, looks like unto the Description of the Coasts in the Dutch book of
voyages…I must confess I can see none of it without my cylinder.139
By observing features on the surface of the moon, both Harriot and Galileo disproved the
Aristotelian notion that heavenly bodies were perfectly spherical. Just as Galileo
emphasized the telescope as an essential scientific instrument in the Medici court in
Tuscany, Harriot employed it to make simultaneous observational discoveries in England.
Though direct references to Copernicus were scant in these exchanges, Lower
complained of those who spoke “slightly of Copernicus” without understanding him, and
he defended Kepler, who had criticized the French mathematician François Viète for his
constant “mend[ing] of things in…Copernicus,” signifying that he, and presumably
Harriot, concurred with Copernicus in general terms.140 The principal concern of Harriot
and Lower, however, seems to have been the removal of the last vestiges of
Aristotelianism in the Copernican system. The observations of Galileo, Harriot, and
138

Letter from Sir William Lower to Thomas Harriot, [undated], in The Elizabethan Reader, ed. Hiram
Haydn (New York: Penguin, 1955), 141-2.
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.

60

others had undermined the notion of the perfection of the superlunar sphere and the idea
that the planets were carried about in their orbits by invisible, solid crystalline spheres.
Now, along with Kepler, who Lower claimed to have “read diligently” at the behest of
Harriot, they were attempting to remove the final Aristotelian axiom of the perfectly
circular motion of the planetary orbits.141 Harriot and Lower had both obviously read
Kepler’s recently published Astronomia Nova, which offered the first observational
evidence for the elliptical orbit of the planets, and Lower wrote to Harriot that “about his
theory [elliptical orbits]… methinks (although I cannot yet overmaster many of his
particulars) he established soundly and as you say overthrow the circular astronomy.”142
With Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical orbits of the planets, the final remnants of the
Ptolemaic and Aristotelian cosmos had been disproved. This opened the door for a new
kind of physics and a new kind of empiricism, both of which affected the practice of
judicial astrology.
The reception of Copernicanism in England was a slow process that went through
several phases. From its first appearance in print as an intriguing mathematical novelty in
1556 to its first unqualified acceptance as a physical reality by Digges in 1576 to its
acceptance based on observational evidence by Harriot in the 1610s, astronomers and
astrologers reacted to Copernicanism in a variety of ways. While it did not immediately
undermine the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system, its mathematical solutions to the problem
of how to precisely predict planetary movements could not be ignored by any
knowledgeable astronomer or astrologer by the end of the seventeenth century. Few
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142

Ibid., 143
Ibid.

61

accepted it as a physical reality at first, but many “semi-Copernicans” accepted its
mathematical description of the cosmos without question. In England, the largely
practical, utilitarian concerns of patrons and their client-scientists meant that as long as
Copernican mathematics provided more precise planetary positions, the heliocentric
theory would grow in influence.
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CHAPTER THREE
COPERNICANISM AND ASTROLOGY IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND:
PATRONAGE AND PRACTICALITY

By the time Copernicanism gained a foothold in England, judicial astrologers had
become fragmented into many distinct camps including philosophical conservatives,
mathematical reformers, and popular prognosticators.143 The conservatives maintained a
version of astrology based on a wide range of astrological traditions and were not
particularly interested in mathematical precision. Among these astrologers who practiced
judicial astrology in the way it had been conducted since ancient times, Copernican
mathematics made little headway.144 Among conservative astrologers less interested in
mathematics or less adept in the precision necessary for utilitarian astrology, the impact
of occult philosophies such as Neoplatonism and Hermeticism held greater sway and they
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practiced astrology based on divination or magic.145 The new cosmology and
mathematics of Copernicus had little effect on how they understood the fundamentals of
astrology, and these astrologers generally wrote books of commentary or theory on the
subject of judicial astrology instead of practicing everyday prognostication.146 Popular
astrologers, sometimes referred to as “vulgar astrologers” by their elite detractors, were
typically not scientists, and their prognostications came in the form of non-mathematical,
usually non-technical almanacs.147 However, during the sixteenth century, conservative
and popular astrologers practiced mainly outside the utilitarian patronage system of
Tudor and Stuart England. Astrological reformers took the criticisms of writers like Pico
della Mirandola to heart and sought to establish judicial astrology as a precise,
mathematical science. The practical concerns of English patrons ensured that these
mathematical reformers flourished at court, where client-scientists’ interests in
mathematical precision paralleled their patrons’ insistence on scientific proof.148
Conservative astrologers rarely commented on the scientific debate between
Ptolemaic and Copernican theories. Typical of the conservative position on astrology, for
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example, was the Italian theologian and astrologer Tommaso Campanella, who wrote that
“whether the sun moves or stands still, it is to be supposed a moving planet by us,
considering the matter from our senses and our description; for the same happens whether
it moves or the earth.”149 Campanella, like many other astrologers more interested in the
metaphysical, emphasized that it was only the relative position of the stars in sky and
their relationship with the individual for whom a horoscope was cast that mattered.
Similarly, in England, the great astrological defender Sir Christopher Heydon, in his
Defence of Iudiciall Astrologie, argued that “whether (as Copernicus saith) the earth be
not the centre of the world, the astrologer careth not,” because astrology was consistent
with both geocentric and heliocentric models of the cosmos.150
While this was true on a theoretical level, it was not necessarily true on a practical
level because knowledge of the precise locations of the planets coincided better with the
interests of nobles whose patronage those reform-minded astrologers required. Therefore,
those who wished to curry favor of potential patrons emphasized this precision.151
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Typical of the astrological reformers was the Dutch polymath Gemma Frisius, whose
very early realization of the impact of Copernicanism on astrology is telling. Two years
prior to Copernicus’s death and the publication of his De revolutionibus in 1543, Frisius
received a copy of Georg Joachim Rheticus’s Narratio Prima, the first printed exposition
of the heliocentric theory. Frisius, a student of medicine at the University of Louvain,
immediately recognized the utility of the theory and expected that its application would
remedy the mathematical inaccuracies of Ptolemaic astrology. In the summer of 1541, he
wrote to John Dantiscus, the bishop of Ermland, lamenting that “many errors, veils, and
many labyrinths…many puzzles more difficult than the Sphinx have enveloped our
astrology,” and he believed heliocentrism was the key to unraveling them.152 Among the
dilemmas he supposed new astronomical tables based on Copernican mathematics would
solve, Frisius specified
the motion of Mars, which I have often found to differ by three elliptical degrees
from even the most exact calculation with astronomical tables. Or the size of the
Moon, which does not vary as much before our eyes as the most reputable authors
of this art maintain. The length of the year has never been determined in perfect
accordance with the truth… The motion of the firmament and the apogees, which,
not even resembling a slight resemblance to the truth, is ridiculed by all. I also
leave aside several other things on the longitude and latitude of nearly all the
fixed stars… If that author [Rheticus] would mend and buttress these
matters…wouldn’t it amount to giving us a new earth, a new heaven, and a new
world?153
somewhat hyperbolically, as a choice between “logic and magic, mathematics and mythology, Athens and
Alexandria.”
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Frisius’s assessment of the problems plaguing contemporary astrology depended heavily
on a detailed knowledge of observational and mathematical astronomy, and he seemed
keenly aware that any meaningful reform in astrology would hinge upon the increased
precision of observational astronomy. With the coming of Copernicus’s longer work two
years later, Gemma Frisius, and other astrologers, got their wish. For Frisius, De
revolutionibus was a key mathematical resource for the better prediction of the position
of the stars and planets. For those who were beginning to regard the precision of
planetary positions as the primary characteristic of a legitimate astrology, this work, and
the tables derived from it, provided a significantly more accurate basis for mathematical
calculations concerning these locations. From the very beginnings of Copernican
astronomy, its relevance for astrological prediction was apparent for those who chose to
utilize it.
Meanwhile, in England, once the Copernican theory had taken root, astrologers
recognized that its mathematics could be employed to benefit judicial astrology. For
example, in 1583 Thomas Heath wrote a treatise on judicial astrology in order to correct
the errors of a previous work by Richard Harvey, whom Heath regarded as a poor
astrologer because he lacked the mathematics necessary to make the proper calculations.
Despite his work’s pessimistic tone, Heath was not anti-astrological. Rather, he urged
people not to lose faith in astrology because of the mathematical errors of a few, and he
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referred to those not familiar with “Copernicus’…[h]ypotheses, Reinholt’s observations,
or Puerbachius’ [tables]” as “simple Astrologians.”154 Harvey’s work became popular
because it predicted terrible events for the year 1588, when a conjunction of Jupiter and
Saturn was to occur. According to contemporary chronicler Raphael Holinshed, much of
the populace of England had reached a point of near hysteria with talk of the prediction
“rife in everie mans mouth.”155
Thomas Heath assuaged the fears of the English by claiming that Harvey made
erroneous predictions based on bad data. He criticized Harvey for employing out-of-date
tables for his calculations and for failing to understand the observable motion of the
planets. “It is well known,” chastised Heath, that Harvey “followed the Alfonsine
account, which at this day is long since found (by the best learned) to halt, prooved
insufficient, exactly to account any apparent motion.”156 For those astrologers who kept
abreast of the latest mathematical tables, the consultation of the Alfonsine tables for
planetary positions would have immediately indicated to the mathematically educated
astrologer the inadequacy of a work. The Prutenic tables had largely replaced the
Alfonsine table by the 1580s, and because Harvey had used these for all of his planetary
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positions, his calculations were off by more than fifteen hours. According to Heath, this
created what “needs be a greate alteration in iudgement” and because of the discrepancy,
Heath predicted that the conjunction was benign rather than malevolent.157 Heath
admonished Harvey for his lack of precision and instructed that “not only to the degree
and minute [of arc] is requisite but also the second, where at any time the coniunction
may happen,” reminding his fearful audience that even seemingly minor errors could
create wildly different predictions.158
The satirist and notable astrological skeptic Thomas Nashe was much less
forgiving in his treatment of Harvey in particular and credulous commoners more
generally. In his 1589 pamphlet Anatomy of Absurdity, Nashe ridiculed those who
interpreted every stellar event as a cause for alarm, writing that “no star [Harvey] seeth in
the night but seemeth a Comet; he lighteth no sooner on the quagmire, but he thinketh
this is the foretold earthquake… Thus are the ignorant deluded, the simple misused, and
the sacred Science of Astronomy discredited.”159 Nashe considered astrologers like
Harvey reckless and sensationalist and he implied that Harvey had taken advantage of
people’s fears to sell his work. For Nashe, the fact that so many had prophesied doom for
the year 1588 and this had not come to pass was proof that “the distemperature of the
stars,” as he put it, was nothing more than a fiction.160 In another pamphlet published
three years later, Nashe referred to Harvey as a “ridiculous Ass” and recommended that
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any astrologer whose predictions turned out to be manifestly false should be shunned by
the profession and never heeded again:
What expectation there was in both town and country , the amazement of those
times may testify: and the rather because he pawned his credit upon it, in these
express terms: “If these things fall not out in every point as I have wrote, let me
forever hereafter lose my credit in Astronomy.” Well, it so happened that he
happened not be a man of his word; his Astronomy broke that day with his
creditors, and Saturn and Jupiter proved honester men than all the World took
them for.161
Furthermore, the year 1588 was witness, not to cataclysm, but to one of the most decisive
English military victories of the century with the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and this
damaged the reputation of astrologers who had predicted terrible events for the year.
Indeed, the reputation of Richard Harvey and those associated with him declined
throughout the 1590s.162
Despite the increased attention to results in the realm of astrological prediction,
Harvey was able to retain some degree of respectability in England due in large part to
the patronage of the Bishop of London. This was fairly typical of astrologers in the
sixteenth century. In England, astrologers appropriated this information primarily in ways
that suited the needs of their patrons. Nearly all members of the higher nobility in
sixteenth-century England employed astrologers at their courts, and the astrologers’
duties typically involved observing the sky or more often consulting with mathematical
tables and making prognostications based on this information. Because the sixteenth
century witnessed not only a consolidation of the centralized state under the powerful
Tudor family but also the economic expansion of England overseas, the nobility became
161
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increasingly aware of the need for well-educated scholars, highly qualified to utilize
various branches of knowledge in service of their interests. Frequently, the same
individuals involved in surveying and mapping a lord’s estate or designing the
fortifications for a castle were also using the similar mathematical techniques of astrology
to prognosticate the future.163
Many of the most illustrious courtiers of the Elizabethan era displayed an eager
interest in the knowledge of astrology. Robert Dudley, the Earl of Leicester, employed
two astrologers personally—one as his physician, another specifically for the casting of
horoscopes—and it was at his request that John Dee determined the most auspicious
moment for the coronation of Elizabeth I in 1558. William Cecil, Lord Burghley,
evidently kept a notebook detailing astrological predictions, and Henry Percy, Earl of
Northumberland, cultivated a circle of client-scientists rich in practicing astrologers who
were knowledgeable in the mathematics necessary to precisely predict planetary
locations.164 Puritan theologian Laurence Humphrey exaggerated little when he remarked
in 1563 that most among the nobility “ravened, embraced, and devoured” the science.165
Since reformist astrologers focused on the precise mathematical basis necessary for
prediction, patrons’ utilitarian interests led them to employ more reform-minded,
mathematical practitioners. For example, in his capacity as a medical practitioner, Robert
Recorde served as a court physician to both the young King Edward VI, to whom he
dedicated several books, and his successor Queen Mary, to whom he dedicated The
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Castle of Knowledge.166 Recorde’s treatment of both astrology and astronomy in this
work exemplified the concatenation of these two fields of study in the mid-sixteenth
century and the significance of mathematics for the study of both.
Though wholly astronomical and mathematical in content, as we have seen, The
Castle of Knowledge contained a preface insinuating that the entire enterprise of
mathematical astronomy was important in the first place because that knowledge gave
men control over the impact of the stars:
So was there never anye greate chaunge in the worlde, nother translations of
Imperies, nother scarse falle of anye princes, nor dearthe and penurye, no death
and mortalitie, but GOD by the signes of heaven did premonish men therof, to
repent and beware betyme, if they had any grace. The examples are infinite, and
all histories so full of them, that I thinke it needles to make any rehearsall of them
more; especially seeyng thei appertain to the Iudiciall part of Astronomy, rather
than to this part of the motions, yet shall it not be preiudiciall… But who that can
skyll of their natures, and coniecture rightlye, to affect them and their
menacynges, shall be able not only to avoide many inconveniences, but also to
achieve many unlikelye attemptes, and in conclusion be a governoure and rulare
of the stars…167
Like many other early modern scholars sympathetic to astrology, Recorde was eager to
refute any charges of determinism that often accompanied the practice of astrology.168
Far from succumbing to power of the stars, astrologers often believed that greater
knowledge of the movement of the stars allowed men greater control over their
destinies—precisely the type of practical control patrons coveted. Just as the practical
knowledge of mathematics provided control over the earth through the arts of navigation
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and cartography, so too could it provide mastery, rather than subservience, to the power
of the stars over human affairs.
Thomas Digges left fewer clues regarding his specific opinion on astrology,
though it seems very likely that he had cast some horoscopes and given his opinion on the
meaning of stellar events, such as the 1572 supernova and 1577 comet. Both of Digges’s
principal patrons—William Cecil, Lord Burghley and Robert Dudley, the Earl of
Leicester—were interested in astrological prognostication. In the 1570s, Digges offered
both Burghley and Leicester “astronomical manuscripts” for the purposes of better
practicing astrology.169 In a lost manuscript dedicated to Lord Burghley, Digges had
included multiple tables designed to determine the positions of the stars and planets in
relation to the horizon, meridian, sun and moon. In the treatise, Digges evidently included
“sundry conclusions both pleasant for variety of knowledge and necessary for common
use” in which he rendered conclusions for “Histories poetical and Judgements
astronomical.”170 It is unclear whether, by “Judgements,” he meant astrological
predictions or definitive information on their positions in the sky, but given Burghley’s
obvious interest in mathematical astrology, it is likely that this referred to both.171 In a
letter to Lord Burghley, Digges claimed he had “waded as far as ancient grounds of
astrology would bear him to sift out the unknown influences of this new star or comet,”
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and he would “[s]end notes of observation and prediction” at a later time.172 Given his
views on heliocentrism, it also seems likely that he used Copernican tables for the
purposes of these predictions.
In the one explicit mention of astrology in his work expounding upon
Copernicanism, Digges claimed that “sundry Astrologians finding the alterations in the
declination and Longitude of stars, have thought that the same also should have his
motion peculiar,” by which Digges meant that there existed a discrepancy between the
way that stars attached to a solid crystalline sphere should move, and the way they do
move because of the changing position of the earth in its orbit. “Yet Copernicus,” Digges
continued, “by the motions of the Earth, solveth all, and utterly cutteth off the ninth and
tenth spheres, which contrary to all sense, the maintainers of the earth’s stability have
been forced to imagine.”173 In the Ptolemaic system, the eighth sphere was that of the
fixed stars, the ninth sphere was called the primum mobile (prime mover), and it existed
to keep the stars in motion, and the tenth sphere was the “Emyrean realm” of God and the
angels. Copernicus removed the ninth and tenth spheres from his physical description of
the cosmos, but maintained the sphere of fixed stars at the very edge.174 In any case,
Digges was clearly interested in both the Copernican conception of the cosmos as well as
the fact that its mathematics provided astronomer-astrologers with more precise positions
of planets.
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Among the earliest English astrologers to utilize Copernican mathematics
specifically in service of his patron was the mathematician John Blagrave. One of
Blagrave’s principal patrons was Charles Howard, the first earl of Nottingham and Lord
High Admiral of the English fleet, which he had commanded at the defeat of the Spanish
Armada in 1588. One of the wealthiest and most powerful men at both Elizabeth I and
James I’s courts, Howard patronized a number of scientists and literati throughout his
lifetime.175 In the dedication to his 1596 study of the astrolabe, Blagrave personally
thanked Howard for “taking a personal interest in [his] personal preference” by which he
meant his acceptance of the Copernican theory.176 Blagrave had mentioned
Copernicanism as early as 1585, in an earlier text on the mathematics of using an
astrolabe, The Mathematical Iewel, in which he acknowledged the complexities and
inadequacies of the Ptolemaic system, but did not fully commit to the Copernican system
as better or more accurate, writing that
Insomuch that the late yeares that singular man Copernicus affirmeth that the
sunne is the fixed centre of the world, about whom the earth moueth (not the
sunne about the earth) and that all the rest of the planets moue regularly about the
center of the sunne sauing the moone which like an epicicle moueth about the
earth in a spheere of the earth 13 times in his yearley motion. But omitting the
inuentions of Copernicus, and a number of the rest, I will only heere shew a figure
of those which haue always bene before his time…177
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This was the only mention of Copernicus in the text, and Blagrave employed Ptolemaic
mathematics and traditional terminology to refer to the cosmos throughout. Still, even at
this early stage, Blagrave appears to have recognized the mathematical advantages of the
Copernican system.
His next foray into Copernican theory came specifically within the context of
judicial astrology, and it appears as though Blagrave was among the reformers who
recognized the advantages of tables based on Copernican mathematics. He desired to
“skillfully acquaint” astrologers “with all the planets, starres, and constellacions of the
heauens…in which, agreeable to the hipothesis of Nicolaus Copernicus, the starry
firmament is appointed perpetually fixed and the earth and his horizons continually
mouing from west towards the east once about euery 24 houres.”178 In the treatise,
Blagrave intended to improve the precision of the astrolabe, a device instrumental in
determining the positions of the heavenly bodies, and provide “all such necessary
supplements for iudiciall astrology, as Alkabitius & Claudius Dariottus haue deliuered by
their tables.”179 With more precise instrumentation and the Copernican model, Blagrave
used this to his observational advantage, noting that “…withall being a thynge [astrolabe]
most commonly in use, and differing in nothing, but that they according to the auncient
Astronomers, appointed the Starry Heavens to move rightwards from East towards West,
uppon the earth or fixed horizon of the place.”180 An astrolabe measured the movement of
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the stars across the sky, which has an apparent east to west motion caused by the daily
rotation of the earth in the opposite direction. Although this effect remains the same
whether the earth rotates eastward or the fixed stars rotate westward, Blagrave
emphasized that the Copernican theory accounted for this movement just as precisely,
observing that
according to Copernicus cause the earth on the horizon to moue leftward from
West toward East , uppon the Starry firmament fixed…In which motion (a pretty
thing to note) one that standeth by shall hardly perceiue any other but that the
Rete mooueth although indeede you turne about the Pater, strongly confirming the
Copernicus Argument, who sayeth that the weakenesse of the senses do imagine
the Heavens to mooue about every 24 houres from East to West by a Primum
Mobile, whereas indeed they have been alwayes fixed and it is the earth that
whirleth about euery 24 houres from West to East, of his own proper nature
allotted unto him, as is most for the receptacle of all transitory things, being
appointed in a place where nothing is to stay him from his continuall
moouing…181
By comparing the rotation of the earth with the similar motion of rete across the surface
of the astrolabe, Blagrave argued for the physical imperceptibility of the Copernican
theory. And his references to both Copernicus and judicial astrologers suggest that he
regarded the two as compatible.
The examples of Digges and Blagrave illustrate the control patrons exerted over
their client-scientists’ astrological works, and if a patron’s interest in a topic diminished,
they simply ended their support. The drastic shift in Digges’s intellectual interests and
writings from the 1570s to the 1580s, for example, exemplifies the influence a patron’s
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interests had over where a client-scientist’s focus would ultimately lie. In the early 1570s,
Digges’s principal patron had been Lord Burghley but this ended for unknown reasons in
1576.182 During his time at Burghley’s court, Digges’s writings concentrated on detailed
analyses of stellar events, which, while they had practical implications for horoscopic
prognostication, apparently did little to contribute to the wealth of Burghley. From 1578
on, Digges became a highly favored client-scientist of Leicester. Though Leicester
accepted astrological prognostication as a legitimate scientific enterprise, he showed less
interest in the mathematical astronomy Digges viewed as necessary for such an endeavor.
After 1578, with the exception of revised editions of his father’s Prognostication
Everlastinge, Digges published no more on the topic of astronomy or astrology.183
Instead, under Leicester, Digges used his knowledge of mathematics to compose military
treatises on the most effective ways to deploy artillery in battle, on the ballistics of
cannonballs and musket shots, and on the provisioning of armies.184 The reasons for this,
as Digges himself wrote in the preface to Straticos, his first military work while in the
service of Leicester, entailed his devotion to the English state and crown:
Even so, albeit the strange varietie of intentions in the more subtile part of the
Mathematicall Demonstrations did breede in me for a time a singular delectation,
yet finding none, or very few, with whom to confer or communicate those my
delights (and also remembering the grave sentence of the divine Plato, that we are
not born for ourselves, but also for our parents, country, and friends), after I grew
to years of riper judgment I have wholly bent myself to reduce those imaginative
contemplations to sensible practical conclusions of those my delectable studies, as
also to be able, when time is, to employ them to the service of my prince and
country.185
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Digges suggested that he had moved on to more practical matters for the necessity of the
state and that the more theoretical mathematics with which he had engaged in his younger
years now benefitted him as he put his knowledge to a use deemed more practical by his
patron. Interestingly, Digges considered mathematical astronomy, and not necessarily
astrology, the “imaginative contemplation” he had renounced. As service to the state in
the form of his patron superseded his personal interests, Digges redefined practicality to
exclude his earlier work on planetary positions and Copernicanism.
Similarly, John Blagrave, whose works extolling the Copernican theory had once
attracted the attention of several notable courtiers, encountered financial difficulties that
curtailed his scientific activity. Blagrave, a man of very limited means, was required to
seek out new patrons as his current ones lost interest in his practices. Blagrave had
cultivated contacts with a large and diverse body of patrons from the 1580s to the 1600s,
deriving support from the aforementioned Charles Howard, as well as the influential
William Cecil, Lord Burghley, and the Member of Parliament Sir Francis Knollys.186
Unfortunately, Knollys died in 1596 and Burghley in 1598. Blagrave wrote regretfully
that “time hath bereft me of all my most Honourable Favourers,” and, just two years
before his death in 1611, he nurtured his relationship with his final patron, James I’s
privy counselor Sir Thomas Parry, through flattery: “…and only your Honour now
succeeding your Honourable Father in place of honour, is the principall hope left unto
me, who in my Mathematick… [infancy] both favoured me, and furnished me out of your
admirable and generall library, of such mathematickes books, as in those daies were
186

Pumfrey and Dawbarn, “Science and Patronage in England,” 152.

79

hardly or not elsewhere to be gotten.”187 Blagrave’s adulation of Parry likely represented
not only an attempt curry favor with a potential financial resource but also a genuine
expression of gratitude since Blagrave required the generosity of a noble like Parry in
order to accomplish his scientific work. Blagrave dedicated all of his published works to
his patrons, and in doing so, he conformed to the pattern of many client-scientists who
hoped to maintain good relations at court. However, as patrons lost interest in
mathematical astrology throughout the early to mid seventeenth century, their financial
support for client-scientists specializing in this field waned as well.
Although patronage remained, broadly speaking, the center of the most advanced
scientific activity during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, some notable
changes occurred within the system. Henry VIII had self-consciously modeled his own
court on the culturally refined courts of Renaissance Italy.188 Throughout the sixteenth
century, the writers, philosophers, and scientists at those courts had successfully
enhanced the cultural prestige of their patrons through their writings and scientific
research, and Henry VIII hoped to emulate this on a national scale in England. By the
time of the reign of Elizabeth, as we have seen, the courts had become the center of
scientific activity in England. Her long reign, though it had its turbulence, provided a
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high degree of stability for the patronization of client-scientists and a relatively open
environment for the exchange of scientific ideas.189 With the coming of the Stuart
dynasty in 1603, this began to change. While lines of scientific communication remained
open and mostly unobstructed, James I sought more centralization of the court system
and exerted a greater level of personal control over what he deemed to be the acceptable
and unacceptable practice of science.
King James I’s attitude toward astrology was complex but he defined it best in his
own scholarly work Daemonologie, published in 1597. James was an accomplished
scholar in his own right, particularly regarding matters of political theory and statecraft,
and Daemonologie examined the legal issues concerning magic, witchcraft, and other
occult phenomena. While the main topic of this work was to prove “that such deuilish
artes haue bene and are” a reality and to determine “what exact trial and seuere
punishment they merit,” the text contained a definition of astrology, an explanation of its
relationship with astronomy, and how to distinguish between the two.190 Like most
scholars of his era, James I discerned between the two concepts of natural and judicial
astrology, making explicit references to both the Bible and commonly accepted
etymology. But he also was among the first to specifically differentiate between
astronomy and astrology—using the original Greek terminology for the words,
astronomia and astrologia—and to consider natural astrology as a category separate from
astronomy. He defined astronomy as “the law of the Starres” and claimed that it was “not

189

See Deborah Harkness, The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the Scientific Revolution (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 1-14 and 142-180.
190
James I, Stuart, Daemonologie [1597], (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1966), xii.

81

onelie lawful but necessarie and commendable” because it was a legitimate science based
on mathematics.191 He defined astrology as the “preaching of the Starres” and delineated
the natural branch as “knowing thereby the powers of simples, and sickenesses, the
course of the seasons and the weather, being ruled by their influence; which part
depending vpon the former [Astronomie], although it be not of it selfe a parte of
Mathematicques: yet it is not vnlawful, being moderatlie vsed.”192According to James I,
natural astrology was a perfectly acceptable practice, though it should not be considered a
branch of mathematics. Rather, natural astrology was a non-mathematical art that merely
relied on the more technical aspects of astronomy.
His treatment of judicial astrology, however, was much less conciliatory. To
follow judicial astrology was
to truste so much to their influences, as thereby to fore-tell what common-weales
shall florish or decay: what, persones shall be fortunate or vnfortunate: what side
shall winne in anie battell: What man shall obteine victorie at singular combate:
What way, and of what age shall men die: What horse shall winne at matcherunning…Of this roote springs innumerable branches; such as the knowledge of
the natiuities, the Cheiromancie, Geomancie, Hydromancie, Arithmancie,
Physiogmnomie, & a thousand others. This parte now is vtterlie vnlawful to be
trusted in, or practized amongst christians, as leaning to no ground of natural
reason…in the Prophet Ieremie it is plainelie forbidden, to beleeue or hearken
vnto them that Prophecies & fore-speakes by the course of the Planets &
Starres.193
In this interpretation, James was not so far removed from the tradition of the astrological
skeptics who argued that astrology was acceptable provided that it did not contravene
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free will. However, by dividing natural astrology from astronomy, James allowed an
outlet for both a form of astronomy and astrology to be practiced. By singling out the
aspects of astrology that he rejected, he was able to relocate the mathematical practice to
astronomy and redefine legitimate astrology as an art form separate from and dependent
upon the more scientific practice of astronomy.
In terms of its impact on the court patronage system, James I’s attitude toward
astrology had surprisingly little effect. After James ascended to the English throne in
1603, the nature of the court changed in several ways. New nobles from his native
Scotland joined the court, often at the expense of the previous Elizabethan ones; the
amount of money funneled into client-scientists actually saw a sharp increase; the court
became even more centralized than it had been under either Henry VIII or Elizabeth I;
and it took on a more scholarly, professional tone.194 At first, based on his rhetoric from
Daemonologie, James seemed to clearly imply that his financial support would extend to
astronomy and not to astrology, indicating how separable these two disciplines were
perceived to be by the early seventeenth century. Indeed, several astrologers encountered
legal trouble under the reign of the first Stuart monarch. As early as 1581, during the
reign of Elizabeth I, Parliament had passed laws making it illegal to cast horoscopes for
royalty without their permission, and there is evidence that both Robert Cecil, the Earl of
Salisbury, and James’s son Prince Henry of Wales had banished or imprisoned
astrologers for breaking this law.195 Furthermore, both Henry Percy, the Earl of
Northumberland, and his favorite client-scientist Thomas Harriot were imprisoned under
194
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James I, in part, because of their illicit use of judicial astrology. Nevertheless, throughout
James I’s twenty-two year reign, he patronized a number of notable astrologers or active
supporters of astrology, including Robert Pont, James Maxwell, and John Napier. Pont
was a numerologist and an active supporter of judicial astrology and Napier, best known
as the first mathematician to use logarithms, was a disciple of judicial astrology.196 James
I was also a patron and defender of the greatly influential mathematical astrologer and
physician Robert Fludd, whose works were among the most widely-read in England in
the 1610s and 1620s.197 Provided that they remain within their legal bounds, James, like
his predecessors, allowed astrologers to continue to practice throughout his reign.
Following his ascension to the throne in 1603, James I brought with him from
Scotland a whole new coterie of noblemen. Most client-scientists who had established
good professional relationships with patrons under Queen Elizabeth I continued to find
support among Jacobean nobles. However, with the addition of James’s entourage from
Scotland, many courtiers from Elizabeth’s reign were replaced in important positions at
the new monarch’s court. Most retained their estates and titles but ceased to serve in any
governmental positions for the first Stuart king. In fact, only Robert Cecil, the Earl of
Salisbury, one of Elizabeth’s favorites, remained directly attached to James’s court, and
he retained essentially his entire retinue of client-scientists.198 Other client-scientists
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faced the decision of remaining with their principal patrons, where they could continue to
practice science without any direct royal support, or whether to pursue connections with
new nobles. Many chose the latter path.
The court of James I even garnered something of an international reputation in
science, particularly because of its utilitarian atmosphere and also because of James’s
staunch Protestantism. For instance, Johannes Kepler originally hoped to use Jacobean
England as a home base for his studies because he viewed King James as the European
monarch most capable of uniting the Protestant world and healing the rifts between
Protestants and Catholics.199 Kepler dedicated his De Stella Nova of 1606 to James I, and
in 1619 he intended to dedicate his Harmonices Mundi, which detailed his theory of the
harmonic relationship between geometrical ratios and the physically observed heavens, to
James I, but the European political situation made it unsafe for him to do so.200 However,
Kepler noted that he hoped his work on celestial harmony would attract the attention of
James I, whose hope for “harmony and unity” among Protestants “in the ecclesiastical
and political spheres” reflected Kepler’s belief in the natural harmony of the celestial
spheres.201 Kepler, who also practiced astrology, believed that James could be persuaded
that with the right scientific and mathematical reform, judicial astrology was as valid a
science as any.202 He originally hoped to accomplish this on English soil but ultimately
turned down overtures from Henry Wotton, the English ambassador to the court of Holy
Roman emperor Frederick II in Vienna, for personal reasons in favor of remaining in
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German lands because he “love[d] the mainland, and fear[ed] the closeness of an
island.”203 But it was the Protestant religion and the intellectual openness that drew him
to the court of James I.
Many mathematical astronomers who also regularly practiced astrology, such as
Johannes Kepler, consciously and categorically separated themselves from nonmathematical astrologers. Kepler’s attitudes toward astrology were complicated, but
given his scientific influence in England and his attempted connections with the Jacobean
court, his positions are important. While he was a practicing astrologer, Kepler was also
critical of many of the contradictory rules of traditional astrology, and he was clearly
influenced by the criticisms of Pico della Mirandola. Like many of his English
counterparts, Kepler regarded a more appropriate application of mathematics as the key
to discovering what was valid, scientific astrology, and what was mere superstition. In
this respect, Kepler called true astrology the “step-daughter of astronomy” and popular
prophecies which relied on no mathematical sciences as “dreadful superstitions.”204 In De
Stella Nova, Kepler remarked that “a mind accustomed to mathematical deduction, when
confronted with the faulty foundations of astrology, resists a long, long time, like an
obstinate mule, until compelled by beating and curses to put its foot into that dirty
puddle.”205
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By accepting astrology as scientifically valid, Kepler assumed that he had no
choice but to apply his mathematical knowledge to the “dirty puddle” of astrology, thus
saving it from its own deficiencies. In a letter to his former mathematics professor
Michael Maestlin, in which he ridiculed what he considered both Catholic and
astrological superstition, Kepler explained that he proceeded “as the Jesuits do, who
correct much in order to make men Catholic. Or rather, I do not act so, for those who
defend all the nonsense are like the Jesuits. I am a Lutheran astrologer, who abandons the
nonsense and keeps the kernel.”206 Kepler recognized that astrology required serious
reform if it were to be regarded as a legitimate science, but he maintained an overall
belief that the heavens exerted some influence over the lives of individual humans. It was
evident that Kepler relied on the advances in mathematical astronomy to support his
reform:
But if I now speak of the outcome of my studies, what, may I ask, do I find far off
in heaven that even remotely refers to it? No inconsiderable part of science,
according to the experts, have been either freshly constructed by me, or corrected,
or completely finished. But in this regard, my stars were not Mercury rising in the
corner of the seventh house 90 degrees from Mars, but Copernicus and Tycho
Brahe. Without the latter’s volumes of observations everything which has now
been brought to me in the clearest light would lie buried in darkness.207
Even as Kepler researched the mathematics of the motions of the heavenly spheres, and
in the process developed what he is best-known for—the three laws of planetary motion,
which disproved Aristotle’s perfectly circular spheres—he used much of this knowledge
to create a more mathematically precise astrology.
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Among the most notable new courtiers under James I was his own eldest son
Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales, the heir-apparent to the English throne. Though only
ten years old at his father’s coronation, Henry proved a precocious youth interested in
traditional chivalric sports such as hunting, but he also seemed eager to apply himself to
academics.208 King James insisted that Henry’s education should be the ultimate focus of
the court, and this facilitated a great convergence of many of the most learned men in
England. According to one of Henry’s tutors Sir Thomas Chaloner, James ordered that
Henry’s household “should rather imitate a college than a court” and that “His Highness’
household...was intended by the King for a courtly college or a collegiate court.”209
Similarly, Timothy Bright, a client-scientist who remained attached to the household of
the Earl of Salisbury following James’s ascension, described life at the Jacobean court as
“akin to a university.”210
Henry’s father initially assembled the court for him, but by his early teen years,
Henry began amassing many of his own client-scientists, particularly those with scientific
knowledge in military matters and geography. One notable member was Edward Wright,
one of the most accomplished geographers of the early seventeenth century who became
Henry’s mathematics and cosmography tutor. For Henry’s education in astronomical
mathematics, Wright designed
a large sphere…for his Highness, by the help of some German workmen; which
sphere by means of spring-work not only represented the whole motion of the
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celestial sphere, but shewed likewise the particular systems of the Sun and Moon,
and their circular motions, together with their places, and possibilities of eclipsing
each other. In it was a work by wheel and pinion, for a motion of 171000 years, if
the sphere could be kept so long in motion.211
Wright was involved in both theoretical scientific pursuits as well as practical—his work
Certaine Errors in Navigation explained the mathematical basis for the Mercator
cartographic projection for the first time, but he also spent much of his time designing
mathematical instruments, such as Henry’s celestial sphere. Henry’s penchant for
patronizing practical, mathematical sciences in particular arose from a developing notion
of English patriotism as England began to take its place on the international stage, both
on the continent and in overseas colonies, during the early seventeenth century. Much as
previous noble patrons of the sixteenth century had emphasized pragmatic scientific
knowledge as a way to advance their careers and increase their wealth, James I and his
son Henry applied this to a national scale, hoping to use the same type of knowledge to
benefit the state as a whole against its European enemies.212 Like many earlier patrons,
Henry hoped to make the “more esoteric studies of astronomy and mathematics” more
accessible and more useful to the English in service of their country.213
Much as Thomas Digges’s and John Blagrave’s experiences with patrons
exemplified the control a patron’s interests exerted over what their client-scientists
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studied, the example of Thomas Harriot epitomizes how the changing fortunes of patrons
had correlative effects on their client-scientists. Harriot attended Oxford from 1577 to
1580, and immediately upon his graduation he became attached to the court of Sir Walter
Raleigh, then a favorite courtier of Elizabeth I, as his mathematics tutor.214 Raleigh
employed Harriot in a variety of capacities as a mathematician, but Harriot’s most
important role in the Raleigh household was as principal advisor for Raleigh’s overseas
ventures. Navigation was the greatest common interest between Harriot and Raleigh, and
Harriot brought his extensive knowledge of mathematics to bear on practical issues
regarding navigation, ship design, and the financial management of Raleigh’s burgeoning
colonial enterprises.215 Under Raleigh’s patronage, Harriot made a voyage to the coasts of
present-day Virginia and North Carolina in 1585-6, where he acted as navigator for
Raleigh’s captains, surveyed and mapped the lands they encountered, and acted as a
liaison between the English explorers and the Algonquians they met.216 Harriot had
learned at least some of the Algonquian language while in London through contact with
two Algonquians living there—Manteo and Wanchese—and he translated for the English
and transcribed much of the language during the voyage.217 The expedition resulted in
brief fame for Harriot after the publication of his Briefe and True Report of the New
Found Land of Virginia, the only work published during his lifetime, which detailed the
geography and material resources of coastal Virginia and gave general descriptions of the
lifestyle and customs of the native Algonquians. Dedicated to Raleigh, this work
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essentially served as propaganda for Raleigh’s own efforts to secure funding for his
colonial ambitions, and with Raleigh’s fortunes on the rise throughout the 1580s,
Harriot’s own star rose as well.218 The fact that Harriot’s Briefe and True Report
remained his only published work reflects how utilitarian Raleigh’s patronage was and
mirrors the experiences of Digges and Blagrave.
By the late 1580s, Harriot had cultivated a new patronage contact with one of
Raleigh’s associate courtiers Henry Percy, the Earl of Northumberland. Northumberland
began as an outsider to the Elizabethan court. Though he was a Protestant, he came from
a Catholic family near the border with Scotland, a fact that would later briefly put him in
the good graces of James I, but under Elizabeth, he was always at risk of being suspect
for his religious and national affiliations.219 Northumberland had great interest in the
“mathematical magic” of astronomy and astrology, and during the last two decades of the
sixteenth century, he assembled a court of scholars well-versed in many related sciences.
The courtier circles of Raleigh and Northumberland overlapped with many clientscientists, including Harriot, who received his main income from Northumberland by the
early 1590s.220 Northumberland, often known as “the wizard earl” because of his
enthusiastic interest in astrology, alchemy, and scientific experimentation, patronized
some of the most accomplished and well-known scientists and natural philosophers of the
1590s, including the mathematicians Robert Hues and Walter Warner, who, along with
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Northumberland’s interest in astrology can also easily be ascertained from the books that
his client-scientists dedicated to him. Of the three that survive, two—Auger Ferrier’s
Learned Astronomical Discourse, of the Iudgement of Nativities (1593) and John Ford’s
The Golden Mean…Discoursing of the Nobleness of Perfect Virtue in Extreames
(1614)—were about astrology and numerology, respectively.222 While Harriot’s interests
gravitated toward the practical while he was in the employ of Raleigh, they moved in the
direction of theoretical speculation once Northumberland became his chief patron.
During the 1590s and 1600s, Harriot’s fate became inextricably tied to these two
patrons, and their successive disgraces marred his otherwise successful scientific career.
In 1591, Sir Walter Raleigh secretly married Elizabeth Throckmorton, one of Queen
Elizabeth’s ladies-in-waiting, without the queen’s permission, and when the queen
discovered this, she had Raleigh arrested and Throckmorton dismissed from her court.223
Raleigh was briefly imprisoned in the Tower of London for these missteps and it took
him several years to regain his courtly prestige and the support of Elizabeth. With
Elizabeth’s death and the ascension of James I, Raleigh’s fortunes, and thus Harriot’s,
quickly took a downward turn. Less than a year into James’s reign, in November 1603,
Raleigh was once again arrested, this time for his connection to individuals involved in
the Main Plot against the new king. This plot was concocted by several English Catholics
who hoped to remove James from the throne and replace him with his Spanish cousin
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Arbella Stuart, briefly considered a contender for the English throne during Elizabeth’s
last years.224 Although Raleigh had no direct involvement in the plot, his close
association with two people who were involved led to accusations of treason. He was
found guilty, but his sentence of execution was commuted by James I, and Raleigh was
imprisoned in the Tower once more, this time until 1616. His release was short-lived
though, and after an expedition to Venezuela in which he harassed coastal Spanish forts,
the Spanish ambassador to England successfully convinced James I to reinstate the death
penalty. Raleigh was beheaded in 1618.225
Harriot’s other patron fell out of favor with the Jacobean court for similar reasons.
Sir Thomas Percy, a Catholic and cousin of the Earl of Northumberland, participated in
the more notable Gunpowder Plot against King James on 5 November, 1605. After the
plot was uncovered and thwarted shortly before being carried out, Percy fled London
before being tracked down and killed by a marksman five days later.226 Much like
Raleigh’s situation two years earlier, Northumberland had no direct involvement in the
plot, but he was suspected of a having a connection to it through his cousin. He was fined
£30,000 and imprisoned in the Tower of London for seventeen years.227
At the time of Northumberland’s incarceration, Harriot relied almost entirely on
Northumberland for his financial well-being and Northumberland’s fall resulted in
momentary disaster for Harriot. He was arrested as well, had his house and all his
224
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scientific papers searched for wrongdoing, and was suspected by royal authorities of
having cast James I’s horoscope for Northumberland.228 Harriot addressed James’s Privy
Council to plead his innocence, claiming that he “was never any busy medler in matters
of state…never ambitious for preferments…but contented with a private life for the love
of learning that [he] might study freely.”229 Harriot was released after a short stay in the
Tower and he got his wish to “study freely,” though unfortunately for him, this meant
that he was severed from both his patrons and reduced to an annual pension of £100. He
never published again, never developed any new relationships with any other potential
patrons, and spent the remainder of his years quietly carrying out research in Copernican
astronomy, atomic theories of matter, and theories of light.230 A year after his release
from the Tower, Harriot carried on a correspondence with Johannes Kepler, who wrote
that he had been “informed that misfortune came to you from astrology. I ask you if you
believe that it could be powerful enough to have such power.”231 It is unclear whether, by
astrology, Kepler meant Harriot’s practice of astrology or the stars’ ill-effects on him.
Harriot’s marginal status as an English scientific figure who exerted virtually no
influence over the scientific community after 1605 directly reflected the marginal status
of his patrons. Unlike most other courtier patrons of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras,
Northumberland seems to have been mostly uninterested in the practical scientific
concerns that many of peers considered paramount. After moving from Raleigh to
228
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Northumberland in the 1590s, almost all of Harriot’s scientific interests revolved around
theoretical matters as well, including astrology. Northumberland’s ostentatious patronage
style put him out of step with the largely utilitarian style of his fellow courtiers, and
Harriot’s negligible influence among scientists was likely among the consequences of
this fact.
In the sixteenth century, practical concerns motivated English astronomerastrologers to adopt Copernican mathematics to solve problems of planetary positions
that the Ptolemaic system could not. These same motives caused them to use this
mathematics in service of astrology. The interests of client-scientists typically aligned
with those of their patrons, and so long as patrons demonstrated a utilitarian interest in
mathematical, scientific astrology, then their client-scientists practiced this form of
astrology by using the most innovative, precise mathematics. During the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries, these were the ephemerides, star charts, and calculations
derived from Copernicus. However, the status of these client-scientists remained directly
linked to that of their patrons, and if patrons lost interest in mathematical astrology—as
happed to Digges and Blagrave—then financial support slowly vanished from these
endeavors. If patrons ran afoul of authorities—such as Raleigh and Northumberland—
then their client-scientists were forced to seek support elsewhere or withdraw entirely
from active scientific research. However, as courts ceased to be the center of scientific
activity throughout the middle of the seventeenth century, astrology moved to other
institutional arenas that wanted something different from astrology and changed based on
the needs of these new institutions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
REDEFINGING ASTROLOGY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY:
UNIVERSITIES, ALMANACS, AND JACOBEAN PATRONAGE

During the Jacobean era, the dominant location for scientific research and writing,
including astrology, had been the royal court and the satellite courts of the nobility.
However, during the mid-seventeenth century, the courts ceased to be the center of
scientific activity, including mathematical astrology. Therefore, astrologers moved to
other institutional venues and sought funding in different ways. The seventeenth century
also witnessed a sharp increase in literacy, particularly among the rising merchant
classes, and an explosion in astrological almanacs, pamphlets, and calendars, many of
which relied less on claims to scientific legitimacy and more on the ability to appeal to a
wider public. As astrology gained esteem among the popular classes, it began to wane in
influence among the scientific community, particularly following the Civil War and the
creation of the Royal Society in 1660. Astrology became re-categorized and redefined as
something other than a science by the very group of English scientists who, for more than
a century, had supported it. The mathematical practice of astrology disappeared, in part,
because mathematicians no longer wished to associate with a field that increasingly
sought mass appeal partially on the basis of excluding technical, mathematical detail. For
decades, astrology had been rejected primarily on moral or religious grounds and
critiqued scientifically by those who believed in it and wished to reform it. Beginning in
the mid-seventeenth century, it was rejected for scientific reasons.
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As we have seen, this dismissal of astrology had little to do with the impact of
Copernicanism but had much more to do with how scientists attempted to define their
practice and where they received their support. As patrons ceased to support astrologers
in the numbers seen in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, astrologers were
forced to find new institutional settings within which to operate. Thus, while astrology
gained in popularity among the popular classes through almanacs and pamphlets, the
English scientific community consciously distanced itself from practicing astrologers as
science simultaneously became a more professionalized discipline.
Although the courts were the locus of major scientific activity in the early
seventeenth century, many of the client-scientists patronized by the nation’s nobility had
attended university and had become well-versed in the traditional curriculum of Latin
grammar and rhetoric, mathematics, and Aristotelian physics and astronomy. Although
universities remained highly traditional establishments offering programs in the seven
liberal arts, they still served as the primary training ground for young scholars eventually
hoping to become attached to the courts. While a university education had been desirable
but not required in the early sixteenth century, by the seventeenth century it became
essential for inclusion in royal courts. A university education not only carried cultural and
intellectual prestige but also prepared future client-scientists for scientific research at
court. For example, a clear majority of practicing client-scientists at the court of Prince
Henry, James I’s son, held university degrees, and the more technical their interests, the
more likely they were to have received one.232 Of the thirty-seven mathematicians,
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astronomer-astrologers, geographers, and cartographers at Henry’s court, twenty-five had
received a Bachelor of Arts degree and all but two received them from either Oxford or
Cambridge.233 This suggests both the rise in the importance of a university education and
also the degree to which this education had become a national affair. The universities and
the courts became more closely linked beginning as early as the mid-sixteenth century
and this relationship expanded throughout the early seventeenth. The chancellorship of
both Oxford and Cambridge belonged to major nobles during both the Elizabethan and
Jacobean eras— Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, a notable astrological enthusiast, held
the chancellorship of Oxford from 1564 until his death in 1588, and William Cecil, Lord
Burghley, held the chancellorship of Cambridge from 1560 until his death in 1598.234
Burghley’s son Robert Cecil, Early of Salisbury, a major patron of the sciences, would go
on to be the Chancellor of Cambridge from 1601 to 1612.235 The chancellorship of both
universities throughout the reign of James I remained firmly in the hands of nobles who
patronized the arts and sciences.
The universities, however, remained locations for a traditional knowledge-base
with content derived from classical antiquity and teaching and learning methodology
derived from high medieval Scholasticism.236 The original intention of the medieval
Scholastic system was to employ dialectical reason and logic in order to resolve
contradictions between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology. Typically, a
university professor revealed the contradictions between two sources of knowledge,
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argued them from both sides, and proposed a resolution. A normal class included a lectio
(“lecture,” or more precisely “reading”), in which a professor read verbatim from an
important text—usually Scripture, Aristotle, the writings of the Church fathers, or recent
commentary on these—and occasionally supplemented this with his own remarks.237
Alternatively, professors used the disputatio, or quaestio disputatio (“discussion of a
question”), where they would answer questions proposed by students beforehand using
Aristotelian logic to come to their conclusions.238 These methods emerged out of the
early university system of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and were generally still
considered standard as late as the early seventeenth century. The university curriculum
followed the trivium of Latin grammar and rhetoric along with logic, and the quadrivium
of astronomy, music, arithmetic, and geometry. More advanced students often went on to
study medicine, law, or theology.239 Although new insights into natural philosophy often
found their way into the traditional curriculum, they remained ancillary to the established
liberal arts.
Even though they were enthusiastic patrons of the sciences at court, both Queen
Elizabeth I and King James I maintained the status quo in the universities. In 1588, upon
receiving a petition for a reform in the curriculum at St. John’s College, Cambridge,
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Elizabethan lawmakers reinforced the traditional Scholastic system, calling it “best…for
the increase of learning, for the greater good of youth, for the state and benefit of the
College.”240 Similarly, in 1601, newly appointed Chancellor Robert Cecil, Earl of
Salisbury, specified that the Scholastic “Lectures and Disputations” be maintained, and
that “all dueties and exercises of learninge be diligently and duely performed accordinge
to the Statutes & Orders of the Universitie.”241 James I explicitly supported the traditional
Scholastic system in 1619 by commanding that “no new erected Lectures…be permitted
to withdrawe Scholars from their attendance on the exercises of Learning, Lectures,
Disputations, Determinations, or Declarations, either publique or private.”242 While they
remained open to a variety of experimental and unconventional approaches to knowledge
acquisition at court, royal authorities and the nobility remained resistant to change in the
institutional university. This not only suggests that royal authorities desired to maintain
control of how knowledge was disseminated and received but also that they viewed the
type of knowledge attained at universities and practiced at court as two separate
enterprises. Presumably, universities provided a stable and standardized curriculum and
methodology that, by its very unchanging nature, ensured that all future scholars would
be familiar with the same body of knowledge and the same procedures of logical
argumentation. At court, however, this methodology was frequently flouted in favor more
empirical methods.
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All manner of non-traditional scholars found homes at courts where they were
offered some degree of protection from the more conservative churches and universities,
where their work would have been seriously stifled. Significantly, all pre-Galilean
Copernicans in England worked outside of Oxford and Cambridge and depended on
patronage for their financial support, while the curriculum at both of those universities
continued to emphasize the Ptolemaic system well into the seventeenth century.243 In fact,
although well-known astronomers such as Everard Digby, William Temple, and Gabriel
Harvey had begun to harshly criticize Aristotle at Cambridge as early as the 1560s, there
is no evidence than any Copernican held any prominent position there until several
decades into the seventeenth century.244
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the position of astrology
also reflected the importance of the court system in the advancement of knowledge and
its obvious differences from the university system. As early as the 1570s, Oxford and
Cambridge professors were delivering lectures critical of judicial astrology, and in 1619,
Oxford’s Savilian professor of astronomy was banned from teaching any astrology
altogether, demonstrating not only the conservative nature of the universities but also the
degree to which astrology had declined in intellectual respectability among some
scientists.245 Astronomy and mathematics, two separate branches of study under the
quadrivium of the seven liberal arts, rarely overlapped in their traditional study, but since
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at least Copernicus, they had begun to coalesce more and more.246 A growing number of
astrological skeptics in the scientific community consciously rejected the application of
mathematics to astrology just as they applied mathematics more readily to the
increasingly distinct science of astronomy.247 By 1649, the astrologer Jeremiah Shakerly
was able to write to his mentor William Lilly that he “often wish[ed] a nearer affinity
between the two Arts of Astronomie & Astrologie,” noting that by then, they had
separated, and astronomy had gained the higher ground as mathematical science.248
During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the patronage system
allowed for much freer thinking and allowed scholars to explore much more unorthodox
topics than was possible at universities. The courts fostered a form of “post-scholastic”
knowledge built on the foundation of a university education (since, by the early
seventeenth century, most client-scientists at court had received one). Court clientscientists oftentimes diverged from the university knowledge-base precisely because the
research that they performed under the auspices of the court system contradicted what
they learned at university.249 While English patrons often required empirical evidence to
validate their financial support, universities required only adherence to the Scholastic
method and logical argument. The Scottish writer John Barclay, who moved to England
shortly after James’s ascension to the throne, singled out client-scientists at the English
court for their willingness to oppose Aristotle and Ptolemy in the realm of cosmology,
writing that “in philosophy and mathematics, in geography and astronomy, there is no
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opinion so prodigious and strange, but in that island was either invented, or has found
followers and subtile instancers.”250 More importantly, patrons’ demands for empirical,
observational, and experimental evidence meant that methodology based on logical
proofs and argumentation faded in importance in the courts more rapidly than in the
universities.
This formula for arriving at knowledge and evaluating evidence found its most
fervent proponent in the works of Francis Bacon. Bacon’s emphasis on empirical
methodology

greatly

impacted

Scientific

Revolution-era

natural

philosophers,

particularly in England. His major work on the topic, the Novum Organon of 1620,
systematically presented his argument against Aristotelian syllogistic logic and for a form
of inductive reasoning based on empirical evaluation of evidence. The very name Novum
Organon evoked Aristotle’s Organon, the compiled body of Aristotle’s six works on
logic, which Bacon hoped to invalidate. Bacon’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, “which
served rather to fix and give stability to errors…than to help the search after truth” was
also a direct criticism of the Scholastic methods of the universities, which rested on the
foundations of Aristotelian logic.251 Bacon stressed that scientists “can do and understand
so much and so much only as [they] have observed in fact…of the course of nature” and
that “our only true hope lies in induction.”252 By linking observation, empiricism, and
induction, Bacon promoted a set of techniques that allowed seventeenth-century scientists
to standardize and homogenize their practice. Furthermore, Bacon also recognized that by
250

John Barclay, Icon Animorum (London, 1614), from The Mirrour of Mindes, trans. T. May 1631, quoted
in Christopher Hill, The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution Revisited, 59.
251
Francis Bacon, The New Organon [1620], ed. and trans. Fulton H. Anderson (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Educational Publishing, 1960), 41.
252
Ibid., 39 and 41.

103

discovering and better understanding the laws of nature, scientists could better control
nature. In the oft quoted passage describing “human power and human knowledge
meet[ing] in one,” Bacon instructed that “where a cause is not known an effect cannot be
produced—nature to be commanded must be obeyed.”253 According to Bacon, scientists
could not control nature without first understanding natural laws.
Bacon, at least in part, had astrology in mind when he wrote this. Three years
after the Novum Organon, Bacon wrote De Augmentis Scientarum, which further
expounded upon his program of empiricism and inductive reasoning through pithy
aphorisms that commented on many areas of human knowledge, astrology among
them.254 Bacon’s view of astrology was much like that of Kepler and other reformers who
recognized that if astrology were to be considered a valid science, it must be subjected to
scientific methodology. “As for Astrology,” Bacon wrote, “it is so full of superstition,
that scarcely anything sound can be discovered in it. Notwithstanding, I would rather
have it purified than rejected altogether.”255 Bacon’s directions for reform, however, were
prescriptive and programmatic and laid out a methodological system which he hoped
astrologers would use in order to reform their science. He merely opened the door—he
asked practicing astrologers to walk through it.
Bacon’s new methodological thinking influenced mathematical astrologers for a
time. For example, the astrologer Jeremiah Shakerley wrote, “Why then shall we subject
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ourselves to the authority of the Ancients, when our own experience can inform us
better?”256 Similarly, the astrologer Joshua Childrey, who was also a telescopic observer
of the heavens, remarked that heliocentrism had been demonstrated “ad oculum,” or “by
sight,” and commented that it made no more scientific sense to continue to practice
astrology under the Ptolemaic system.257 In fact, those who attempted a Baconian reform
practiced what some contemporaries referred to as astrologia sana, or “sane
astrology.”258 However, Bacon’s request for an empirically-based astrology was a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, as with the mathematical reforms attempted by
scientists since the time of Pico della Mirandola and Copernicus, a further reform
employing the Baconian inductive method allowed judicial astrologers to claim more
ground as legitimate scientific practitioners. On the other hand, astrologers were
ultimately addressing problems that had no solutions and the increased application of
empiricism to astrology only further revealed its scientific inadequacies.
It was during the second half of the seventeenth century that the decline of
astrology as a legitimate scientific practice became clear. As we have seen,
Copernicanism in general did not have any ill-effects on the practice of astrology, and for
those astrologer-astronomers mathematically savvy enough to recognize its advantages
and appropriate its methods for the benefit of astrology, Copernicanism actually solved
some of the problems of astrology. What contributed to the downfall of astrology in the
scientific community? The principal complaints against astrology from its detractors had
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been largely political and religious—the scientific complaints against it were typically
made by those who wished, not to destroy it, but to reform it. But by the second half of
the seventeenth century, it began to be ridiculed scientifically as well. Far more damaging
for astrology than the Copernican theory was the discovery of more astronomical bodies,
beginning with the Galilean moons of Jupiter in 1610. While not explicitly contradictory
to the tenets of astrology, the existence of more heavenly bodies suggested to many that
all prior astrological literature was flawed because it did not, indeed could not, take into
account the influence of these moons.259
More complications arose with increased European travel to the southern
hemisphere. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and particularly
following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, English voyages to the New World
and to locations south of the equator rose dramatically as the English joined the Spanish,
Portuguese, Dutch, and French in overseas exploration. Astrological critics noted that
with an entirely new set of stars up until then unseen and unknown by Europeans, an
entire new set of rules would be required to explain the effects of the stars and planets on
people living in these locations.260 Furthermore, the locations of the planets, sun, and
moon were in different constellations during different seasons in the southern
hemisphere, and these could not be reconciled with the way astrology had been practiced
from the time of Ptolemy to the early modern era without serious revision. For example,
in his Tetrabiblos, Ptolemy had designated Leo “the sign of the sun” because the sun was
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in the constellation Leo during the warmest time of the year from late July to late August.
Critics argued that in the southern hemisphere this should be reversed, and Aquarius
should be designated the sign of the sun.261 Both detractors of astrology such as Pico
della Mirandola and reformers such as John Dee recognized this.
The idea of the infinity of the universe and the ever expanding catalogue of stars
also complicated astrological practice. The idea of an infinite universe, proposed by
Western astronomer-astrologers such as Nicholas of Cusa and Marcellus Palingenius,
dated back as far as the mid-fifteenth century.262 Noted pre-Galilean Copernicans and
adherents to judicial astrology Thomas Digges and Giordano Bruno both posited a suncentered universe with an infinite number of stars extending into infinite space. The
introduction of even more heavenly bodies—from the Galilean moons of Jupiter to the
increasingly abundant stars discovered with the help of the telescope—merely multiplied
the complexity. Among reformist astrologers, the effects of the heavens on human events
could be determined through closer observation of the heavens and more precise
measurements of the movements of the stars and planets, but this became significantly
more difficult as the objects in the heavens seemed to increase exponentially.263
This difficulty had been taken up by both John Dee and Thomas Digges in the
mid-sixteenth century. Though he had maintained the Ptolemaic notion of a sphere of
fixed stars, Dee had admitted a similar problem when attempting to discern the means by
which heavenly bodies exerted an influence over the earth. According to Dee, the
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astrological influences of the stars and planets were carried in the light they emitted. This
light emerged and formed a cone in which the planet or star of origin marked the vertex
and the surface of earth touched by this light marked it base. The further away a planet or
star was from the earth, argued Dee, the more surface area it illuminated, and thus, the
greater power it had to affect human events.264 If Digges followed Dee’s interpretation of
the power of stars as inversely proportional to their distance from the earth, which is quite
possible given their former professional relationship, then Digges’s new model of an
infinite Copernican cosmos created even more complexities for reformist astrologers.265
On the one hand, the stars now stood at a much greater distance from the earth than they
had with Copernicus’s sphere of fixed stars, meaning that their influence on the earth was
even greater. On the other hand, if every individual star stood at varying distances from
the earth, then it made precise measurement all but impossible for reformist astrologers.
Unfortunately, Digges left no record of having directly adapted his astrology to this
cosmological structure.
Astronomer-astrologers in England had not yet resolved this problem by the early
seventeenth century. In fact, amidst the accumulation of new stars and moons discovered
about the planets, many astronomer-astrologers consciously limited the number of stars
they accepted as important for complete knowledge of their astrological effects. Just days
after Galileo’s publication of Sidericus Nuncius in 1610—which announced his
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discoveries of mountains and valleys on the moon, the phases of Venus, and moons
circling Jupiter—Henry Wotton wrote to Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, that “upon the
whole subject, he [Galileo] hath overthrown all former astronomy…and next all
astrology. For the virtue of these new planets must needs vary the judicial part, and why
may there not yet be more.”266 In 1624, astrologer and almanac publisher George
Hawkins wrote that the amount of stars astrologers should regard as relevant for use in
prognostications “should be limited to 1,025 stars and no more” since astronomers and
astrologers should not be expected to “take account of every little star.”267 Significantly,
the figure of 1,025 was derived from Ptolemy’s star catalogue, which counted 1,028 stars,
while admitting the possibility that there were more.268 Just four years later in 1628,
almanac-writer Eustace Clarke, a Copernican, wrote of many more stars, claiming that
The number of fixed Starres is commonly defined as 1725, although their exact
number cannot indeed be exactly limited, being almost infinite as the
Astronomers do descrie, by an help of the hollow instrument of the invention of
Galilaeus: By said instrument, Venus is discerned with the eie, increasing and
decreasing as the moon. Saturne is seen having three bodies [i.e., rings]; Jupiter
having four other Starres moving with him for his attending guard. Likewise the
Sunne himselfe appeareth diversely spotted as the Moon…269
Both the addition of known stars augmented by the observations of Tycho Brahe and the
discovery of new celestial bodies by Galileo seriously brought into question judicial
astrology as it was practiced in the mid-seventeenth century.
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While mathematical astrology found difficulties among both its critics and
reformers, popular texts flourished among the increasingly literate populace of England,
whose access to astrology was facilitated primarily through the publication of almanacs
and short tracts on its practice. Almanacs helped to popularize Copernican astronomy as
well as astrology, particularly in the first half of the seventeenth century, and the focus of
many almanacs on applied astrology meant that in many cases, expositions of the
Copernican theory and astrology went hand in hand, usually in non-mathematical ways.
In fact, most people educated enough to read pamphlets received most of their knowledge
about astronomy, including the Copernican system, through astrological almanacs and
manuals.270
Almanacs of the early seventeenth century marked a transitional period from the
influence of scientific, mathematical astrology to the popularity of non-mathematical
astrology. As we have seen from examples such as Leonard and Thomas Digges’s
Prognostication Everlastinge, almanacs often offered a variety of compendious
information of astronomical, astrological, meteorological, or agricultural significance.
Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these were often highly
technical manuals that employed complex mathematics, and many recommended the use
of Copernican mathematics for astronomical and astrological calculations. However,
while many popular astrologers of the mid-seventeenth century relied on the same
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mathematical calculations as the astrological reformers, they ceased to emphasize these
technical details in their almanacs.271
This transition occurred over several decades. For example, one of the most
ardent Copernican astrologers and popular almanac publishers of the 1610s was Thomas
Bretnor. A self-styled “professor of mathematicks and student of the physickes,” Bretnor
openly mocked those who refused to accept Copernicanism despite the mathematical and
observational evidence, referring to the geocentric theory of Ptolemy as a “vulgar
opinion” and an “old fantasie.”272 Bretnor often took note in his description of the
movement of the heavenly bodies that when he wrote about the sun’s movement, he
meant not that it truly moved, but that it appeared to move relative to the earth:
This Brumal season, commonly called Winter, and visually taken for the first
quarter of our Astronomicall yeare, tooke its beginning the 11 or December last:
for then (according to the old dotage [the geocentric theory]) did the Sun enter the
first scruple of the cold and the melancholicke signe Capricorne, or rather
according to the verity this earthy planet entering the first minute of Cancer, and
furthest deflected from the Sunnes perpendicular raies, did then receiue least
portion of Sunshine, and greatest quantitie of shadow.273
Later, Bretnor went on to change various descriptions in his own almanacs regarding the
locations of the planets with relation to the constellations, for example, rewriting “the sun
in Aries” as “the earth in Libra” to better conform to the Copernican cosmos.274 His
almanac, published annually from 1607 until 1635, consistently employed Copernican
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mathematics and mentioned Ptolemy or the geocentric system only to ridicule them.
Similarly, the popular Copernican astrologer Joshua Childrey wrote in 1652 that all
calculations regarding the positions of the planets should be made “with respect to the
sun” rather than “with respect to the earth,” as many still did.275 Both Bretnor and
Childrey advocated these changes out of a desire to see more precise calculations
regarding the positions of the planets and more accurate predictions. However, these
astrologers were among the last generation to emphasize mathematics or even
Copernicanism in their almanacs as a means of promoting their own legitimacy.
Seventeen years later, in 1669, Childrey wrote to Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the
Royal Society, wondering “why in that Synopsis of…Sprats history [of the Royal
Society], ye Aspects of ye Planets should be omitted.”276 Childrey lamented that
astrologers were no longer interested in the systematic mathematical reform that had
characterized the earlier century. Once readers assumed that astrologers’ methods were
scientific, their interests turned to their ability to correctly prognosticate future human
events.
By the 1630s few almanac-makers or practicing astrologers adhered to the
Ptolemaic system any longer, and the debate for the next two decades revolved around
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the applicability of astrology to the Copernican and Tychonic systems. The Tychonic
system, named after Tycho Brahe and sometimes referred to as the geoheliocentric
theory, was a hybrid system that combined the mathematics of the Copernican system
with the physical conception of the Ptolemaic system. In the Tychonic system, the sun
and moon revolved around an immobile earth while the five planets revolved around the
sun. Mathematically, it accounted for the motion of the heavenly bodies as precisely as
the Copernican system, but unlike Copernicus, Tycho included many of his own
observations of the heavens when he presented his theory.277 Ironically, it was these very
observations that eventually led Johannes Kepler, Tycho’s former assistant, to the
conclusion that the planetary orbits were elliptical rather than circular, thus negating the
need for Tycho’s system. “I confess that when Tycho died,” Kepler later wrote, perhaps
with some guilt, “I quickly took advantage of the absence, or lack of circumspection, of
[Tycho’s] heirs, by taking the observations under my care, or perhaps usurping them.”278
Though a Copernican, Kepler also based his Rudolphine Tables of 1627, which replaced
the now-outdated Prutenic Tables of 1551, on Tycho’s observations. By the 1650s, the
Tychonic system had few adherents in the English astronomical or astrological
communities.
Practicing popular astrologers, however, removed themselves from the
mathematical and scientific debate. As late as the 1680s, the English astrologer and
almanac-writer John Goad reassured his followers that astrology could operate under any
cosmological framework and that if the debate between the Copernican and Tychonic
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systems “proves to be non-Conclusive, we must need averr, that our principle of
Prognostic is unquestionable.”279 As patrons’ interest in astrology declined, they
employed fewer and fewer astrologers at court, and these astrologers often found
themselves employed by the public at large, whose purchase of their almanacs constituted
their primary income.280 Ephemerides, those multi-year collections of planetary tables
upon which astrologers had once heavily relied, ceased to contain their astrological
components by the final third of the seventeenth century.281 In the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, ephemerides often contained lengthy introductions describing their
astrological uses, horoscopes, and tables specifically exhibiting the aspects, or the relative
angles between two heavenly bodies. By the 1670s and 1680s, most ephemerides had
dropped all explicit references to astrology. Correspondingly, by the turn of the
eighteenth century, the complex mathematical demonstrations from the almanacs
showing how to determine the positions of the planets oneself had almost entirely
vanished, leaving only a non-mathematical description of the planets’ aspects.282 No
longer preoccupied with justifying their practice through the latest mathematical and
astronomical advances, the scientific reform of astrology subsided.
While evidence of this decline in mathematical astrology exists in the textual
records of these ephemerides, its cultural origins date back to at least the 1640s and the
coming of the English Civil War. On the eve of the war in 1642, the royal government
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exerted complete control over the legal status of astrology, and following the example of
both the Elizabethan and Jacobean governments, Charles I allowed astrologers to practice
and publish provided that they refrained from prognosticating anything negative about
the royal government.283 As late as 1641, a Jacobean law required that “all printers and
booksellers” who publish “any prophecies or almanacs” must have them “seen or revized
by the archbishop or bishop (or those who shall be expressly appointed for that purpose)
and approved by their certificates, and, in addition, shall have permission from us or from
our ordinary judges.”284 However, following the Long Parliament’s defiance of Charles
I’s authority and the king’s absconding from London in January 1642, the censorship
system collapsed and the publication of pamphlets and almanacs increased
exponentially.285
Before 1640, no printed newspapers existed in England; by 1645, there were over
a hundred in print, and nearly all contained astrological predictions.286 Similarly,
pamphlets—short political tracts published cheaply, often with astrological overtones—
multiplied as well. George Thomason, a mid-seventeenth century book collector, claimed
to have collected only twenty-two astrological pamphlets in 1640, while he found nearly
two thousand just two years later.287 The Civil War contributed to a sort of pamphlet
warfare between astrologers who were Parliamentarians and those who were Royalists,
and political and religious concerns motivated pamphleteers and their consumers far
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more than scientific ones. The uncertainty that accompanied the English Civil War and
the Interregnum contributed to a drastic increase in what many contemporary scientists
somewhat disparagingly called “vulgar astrology,” while the execution of Charles I and
the removal of his court from power in 1649 meant that the patron-client relationship that
had fostered scientific and mathematical astrology for over a century had come to an
end.288
By the time of the Restoration of the monarchy and the coronation of Charles II in
1660, astrology, as it was accepted in English society, had irrevocably changed. Despite
the fact that the monarchy survived the Civil War and the nobility returned to court
largely intact, the locus of scientific activity moved to a newfound institution, the Royal
Society.289 Founded in the very year of the Restoration, the Royal Society promoted the
Baconian ideals of experimentalism and empiricism and provided English scientists with
an official community within which to conduct research. Astrology was almost entirely
absent from its records. Entire years went by without its mention, and when scientists did
discuss it, they often did so negatively.290 The lack of experimental demonstrability
suggested to many scientists that, as anti-astrological writer Thomas Cooper contended,
“the rules of this art have no foundation in experience.”291 By the late 1650s, according to
the astrologer John Gadbury, students at both Oxford and Cambridge could not be
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bothered to study judicial astrology, “bawl[ing] loudly in the Schools” that “astrology is
not a science.”292
At the very same time, popular almanacs remained on the rise. At their height in
the late 1650s, astrological pamphlets and almanacs accounted for as much as one third
of all English book sales, and after the Bible, were reportedly the most widely read works
in all of England.293 The general populace did not require the type of utilitarian proof that
patrons coveted in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, nor did they insist on
adherence to empirical or experimental methodology. Despite the fact that late
seventeenth-century pamphleteers, almanac-makers, and common astrologers still
practiced a form of astrology largely derived from the mathematical astrology of the
previous century, they had no need to convince their primary customers—the English
public—of the scientific efficacy of astrology. And as the scientific community
consciously disassociated itself from the practice of astrology and redefined it as
something outside the bounds of science, the new, popular astrological community
embraced it as a lucrative practice that the English populace craved. Where once it was in
the interest of scientists to legitimate astrology as a mathematical science, it became in
their best professional interest to scorn it.
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CONCLUSIONS

“The majority of that which is called superstition
is born from a mistaken application of mathematics.”
–Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
“The question of all questions for humanity,
the problem which lies behind all others and
is more interesting than any of them,
is that of the determination of man’s place
in nature and his relation to the cosmos.”
– T.H. Huxley

Contrary to traditional historiography, the Copernican theory did not contribute to
the demise of judicial astrology. In fact, among those reformers within the English
patronage system who utilized Copernican mathematics to more precisely predict the
motions of the planets, it actually strengthened its legitimacy. The reformist astrologers
intent on making judicial astrology a more exact science appropriated new mathematical
tables where they could. As patrons defined the value of science in terms of its practical
utility, many English judicial astrologers successfully argued for scientific legitimacy
based on their ability to precisely predict planetary locations. Provided that patrons
persisted in considering this modus operandi practically useful, judicial astrologers
continued to flourish within this system. However, while the positions of the stars and
planets became increasingly predictable in post-Copernican astronomy, prognostication
of human events did not.
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The process of by which early modern scientists redefined and re-categorized
knowledge about astrology occurred within the context of the Scientific Revolution. The
utilization of observational techniques and experimentation, the employment of logically
inductive reasoning, and the precise quantification of data all signified major
transformations in the way scholars acquired knowledge about the physical world. Yet
early modern scientists did not adopt these methodological characteristics all at once, nor
did they all accord them equal legitimacy. Those early modern astrologer-astronomers
who embraced these techniques quickly found themselves with much more precise data
regarding the positions and motions of sun, moon, stars, and planets. Given these new
defining characteristics of science and the technical problems besetting Ptolemaic
observational astronomy, it is unsurprising that many early modern astrologerastronomers attempted to subject their practice to the rigors of these new methods in
order to proclaim scientific authenticity and secure patronage. During the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries, reformist astrologers became scientific by appropriating the
mathematics of Copernicus in order to sustain their legitimacy. This process worked
particularly well within the English patronage system. However, while precise
mathematics led to more accurate measurements in other arenas of scientific thought,
precise predictions of planetary and stellar positions failed to yield more accurate
predictions of human events. Giorgio de Santillana has defined science as “the search for
impersonal invariants behind events.”294 Despite the best efforts of reformist astrologers,
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who girded judicial astrology with a new mathematical foundation, the events they
sought to predict remained both highly personal and infinitely variable.
Astrology underwent major changes between the mid-sixteenth and midseventeenth centuries as reformers attempted to maintain its scientific status, and these
modifications had both external and internal aspects. Externally, in England, social,
cultural, and economic factors all transformed how scientists thought about astrology.
The rise in overseas exploration, the increase in literacy among the popular classes, the
founding of the Royal Society, and the shift in interest of astrology’s principal financial
supporters, the noble patrons, all deeply affected how astrologers practiced and how
society valued them. Internally, the scientific process of attaining knowledge changed to
incorporate new methods and new modes of inquiry. While mathematically precise
calculations of the positions of the planets sufficed among scientific astrologers in the
mid to late sixteenth century, this was no longer exclusively sufficient to be considered
scientific by the mid seventeenth century. This process—both its external and internal
variants—depended heavily on the primary audience of astrologers and who the arbiters
of scientific value were. When it was patrons, practical, utilitarian concerns dominated.
When it was the public at large, these concerns faded in importance next to the personal
satisfaction that prognostication provided for astrological consumers. When it was
scientists, by the mid-seventeenth century, more than merely mathematical precision was
needed—astrology had to conform to the experimental method, to empirical evaluation,
and to logical induction in order to be considered a science. Its inability to do so meant
that scientists reclassified it beyond the boundaries of science.
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The story of astrology’s transformation is complicated. There is no monocausal
explanation for why astrology changed when and how it did, and socio-cultural,
economic, and methodological reasons all played a role. To speak of the demise of
astrology, however, is to speak both ahistorically and with a clear retrospective bias.
Because astrology ceased to be a science in the late seventeenth century, modern
historians often write of its decline, failure, or death. But during this period of “decline”
among the scientific community, astrology increased in popularity among the non-noble
classes of England and transformed into the version that is most well-known today.
Obviously, astrology is not dead—a simple perusal through the back pages of a
newspaper or an Internet search reveal that it is very much alive and well.295
Much like the historian of science Wayne Shumaker, who, despite his admitted
antipathy toward modern practitioners of occult arts, professed hope that “disbelief has
not got in the way of comprehension,” I have aspired to treat astrology on its own
terms—which in early modern England means treating it as a science.296 Shumaker urged
historians to treat the history of the occult within the context of the “history of ideas, as
research into mental patterns of a distant period from which we have inherited much that
is precious,” and astrology certainly fits this mold.297 We must not forget that the same
impulse that caused Copernicus to proclaim triumphantly that “in so many…ways do the
planets bear witness to the earth’s mobility” also gave astrologers the impetus to
determine humanity’s relationship with the cosmos.
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